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1. Introduction  
Because the environment and natural resources are crucial for building and consolidating 
peace, it is urgent that their protection in times of armed conflict be strengthened. There 
can be no durable peace if the natural resources that sustain livelihoods are damaged or 
destroyed.1  
 
1.1 Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict: 
Development of the Topic 
The first instance of widespread public attention to environmental damage caused in armed 
conflicts was sparked by the United States’ use of the toxic herbicide Agent Orange during the 
Vietnam war.2 Since then, the burning of oil wells during the Iraq–Kuwait war (1990–91), the 
chemical contamination following the bombing of industrial sites in Kosovo (1999), and the oil 
leak in the Mediterranean Sea during the Israel–Lebanon war (2006) are only a few examples 
of environmental harm being caused during an armed conflict. From more than 20 post-conflict 
observations during the last two decades the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) has 
concluded that significant environmental harm is caused during armed conflict.3  
The issue has also been recognized by the International Law Commission. After 
encouragement from UNEP the topic Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts was put on its program of work at its sixty-fifth session in 2013.4 The Special 
Rapporteur has to date presented three reports on the topic, resulting in a set of draft principles 
and commentaries provisionally adopted by the Commission.5 The work is not yet concluded, 
and several Commissioners, as well as states, have expressed a desire for the issues of state 
responsibility and the responsibility of non-state actors for environmental damage caused in 
armed conflict to be addressed in future reports.6 The need for investigating these issues further 
is also reflected in the suggestion by the Special Rapporteur that “questions on responsibility 
                                                
1 UNEP, “Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law” 
(UNEP, Switzerland, 2009), inside cover: “About the Report”.  
2 Ibid., p. 8.  
3 Ibid., p. 4. 
4 International Law Commission, Report on its Sixty-Fifth Session (6 May to 7 June and 8 July to 9 August 
2013), UN Doc. A/68/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2013, Volume II, Part Two, para 19.  
5 International Law Commission, Report on its Sixty-Eighth Session (2 May to 10 June and 4 July to 12 August 
2016), UN Doc. A/71/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2016, Volume II, Part Two, paras 188 
and 189. 
6 See ibid., paras 166 and 178 for the opinions of Commissioners. On the meetings of the Sixth Committee on 1 
and 2 November during the seventy-first session in 2016, this view was expressed by several States who took the 
floor on the subject. See for instance the statements by Lebanon, Portugal, Spain, Micronesia (UN Doc. 
A.C.6/71/SR.28, paras 18, 33, 43 and 59), and Iran (UN Doc. A.C.6/71/SR.29, para 92).  
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and liability, as well as the responsibility and practice of non-State actors and organized armed 
groups in non-international armed conflicts” be addressed in future reports.7 
This thesis will investigate what remedies are available when environmental damage 
has been caused in an armed conflict.8 It will also attempt to evaluate to what extent these 
remedies are a reflection of the widely recognized principle that the polluter should pay for 
damage it has caused the environment. The issue can be placed in the intersection of the law of 
armed conflict, international environmental law and the law of state responsibility. Clearly, the 
subject of this thesis falls within an area of law that both states and the foremost experts in the 
field agree needs to be investigated further, both in order to provide codification of applicable 
rules and in order to promote progressive development of international law.9  
In examining the role of environmental justice in war, Okowa has concluded that the 
law of armed conflict focuses, perhaps excessively, on inter-state conflicts and that this body 
of law suffers from “significant normative gaps” when it comes to environmental protection.10 
She argues that the restriction to damage which is widespread, long-term and severe, under 
article 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, renders the 
provision inapplicable in most conflicts.11 A further such gap is the lack of provisions providing 
environmental protection in the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which applies to non-international armed conflicts. Several other scholars agree that such 
normative gaps exist.12 On this note, it has been argued that multilateral environmental 
                                                
7 International Law Commission, Report on its Sixty-Eighth Session, para 152.   
8 For the purposes of this thesis, the “environment” is defined as made up of natural resources, both abiotic and 
biotic, such as air, soil, water, fauna, and flora, and the interactions between them. These environmental 
components are referred to in the two Conventions adopted under the Council of Europe on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment (adopted 21 June 1993) ILM 32, 1228 
(Lugano Convention) and on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
(adopted 17 March 1992, entered into force 6 October 1996), 1936 UNTS 269 (Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes Convention). Since the thesis will not go into aspects of cultural heritage or aesthetic 
aspects of the landscape, the dividing line drawn by the exclusive application of some law of armed conflict 
provisions to the natural environment, will not be elaborated on further. (See B. Sjöstedt, Protecting the 
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict: The Role of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Diss. Lund 
University, 2016) pp. 42f. for a discussion. Regarding the term “armed conflict”, a distinction needs to be made 
between international and non-international armed conflict. The definitions of these terms will be introduced in 
the two cases that deal with each respectively.  
9 The mandate of the International Law Commission, as provided by article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United 
Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter).  
10 P. Okowa, “Environmental Justice in Situations of Armed Conflict” in J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), 
Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 231–252, at pp. 247–250.  
11 Ibid.  
12 See M. Schmitt, “War and the Environment: Fault Lines in the Prescriptive Landscape” in J.E. Austin and 
C.E. Bruch (eds.), The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives, 
digitally printed version (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 87–136, at p. 104; R. Falk, “The Inadequacy of 
the Existing Legal Approach to Environmental Protection in Wartime” in J.E. Austin and C.E. Bruch (eds.), The 
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agreements (MEAs) concluded in peacetime can serve to fill some of the lacunas presented by 
protection under the law of armed conflict.13 In fact, Ebbesson considers it to be primarily 
through multilateral agreements that international environmental law has developed over the 
last decades.14 The inclusion of the topic Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts on the agenda of the International Law Commission, as well as Resolution 15 
approved by consensus at the UN Environment Assembly in May 2016,15 indicates that the 
international community is willing to revisit the question of strengthening the protection of the 
environment in relation to armed conflict.  
With this thesis, I aim to build on the realizations by scholars that the law of armed 
conflict often leaves more to wish in terms of protection of the environment. How does this 
relate to the remedies available and their reflection of the polluter pays principle? MEAs have 
been identified as a productive way forward, in ensuring higher environmental protection in 
war. Can they offer a way forward also in terms of remedies which reflect the polluter pays 
principle?  
 
1.2 Do the Available Remedies Reflect the Polluter Pays Principle? Purpose 
of the Thesis 
1.2.1 Purpose  
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent the remedies available in international 
law for environmental damage caused during armed conflict reflect the polluter pays principle, 
as informed by a theory on environmental justice. The scope of this purpose is narrowed down 
by the use of a case study-method, where two cases are used to identify specific remedies. The 
cases also serve to provide context to the evaluation of the extent to which the remedies reflect 
the polluter pays principle.  
 
 
                                                
Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives, digitally printed version 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 137–155, at, p. 138.  
13 See Sjöstedt (2016); S. Vöneky, “Peacetime Environmental Law as a Basis of State Responsibility for 
Environmental Damage Caused by War” in J.E. Austin and C.E. Bruch (eds.), The Environmental Consequences 
of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives, digitally printed version (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 190–225.  
14 J. Ebbesson, Miljörätt, 3rd ed. (Iustus, 2015), p. 28.  
15 UN Environment Assembly of the UN Environment Programme Resolution 2/15 of 27 May 2016, “Protection 
of the Environment in Areas Affected by Armed Conflict”, UN Doc. UNEP/EA.2/Res.15, 4 August 2016. 
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1.2.2 Available Remedies  
The remedies available under international law for environmental damage caused during armed 
conflict include the different forms of reparation enabled by the law of state responsibility as 
well as other possible remedies available under applicable MEAs. This thesis will also 
investigate the possibilities of enacting such responsibility from non-state actors. 
In order to clarify the structure of the thesis, a few remarks on the law of state 
responsibility will be made here. Currently, there is no special area of international law 
regulating the responsibility of states for wartime environmental damage. Instead, the general 
rules of state responsibility are applicable. Shaw describes state responsibility as “a 
fundamental principle of international law, arising out of the nature of the international legal 
system and the doctrines of state sovereignty and equality of states”.16 The state responsibility 
doctrine is best understood as a set of secondary rules concerned with “consequences flowing 
from a breach of a substantive rule of international law”.17 It should also be noted that the law 
of state responsibility has been found to continue to apply in wartime.18 For the purposes of this 
thesis, which seeks to evaluate the compatibility of remedies for environmental damage in 
armed conflict with the polluter pays principle, that means that both substantive rules of 
international law and the content of the law of state responsibility will be of interest.  
The International Law Commission has prepared a set of draft articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILCDA), which contain a basic rule 
governing the allocation of responsibility between states: “Every internationally wrongful act 
of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.”19 Article 2 goes on to clarify that 
“an internationally wrongful act of a state” exists when conduct or omission which is 
attributable to the state breaches an obligation which the state has under international law. This 
means that regardless of whether a state has violated an obligation encompassed in a treaty or 
in customary international law, responsibility is entailed. Neither article stipulates a standard of 
                                                
16 M. N. Shaw, International Law, 7th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 566.  
17 Ibid.  
18 A. Leibler, “Deliberate Wartime Environmental Damage: New Challenges for International Law”, 23 
California Western International Law Journal (1992), pp. 67–137, at p. 75.  
19 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with Commentaries, Report on its Fifty-Third Session (23 April to 1 June and 2 July to 10 August 2001), UN 
Doc. A/65/20, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Volume II, Part Two, article 1. Henceforth, 
ILCDA. It should be noted that in 2001, the ILCDA were annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 
12 December 2001 “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 28 
January 2002, whereby the General Assembly commended them to governments (para 3), something which 
should be seen as giving particular weight to the articles.  
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fault – prima facie – responsibility appears to be strict. However, the applicable material rule 
can set its own standard of fault. The standard of fault of the material rules which are applicable 
to the cases of this thesis will be addressed in the case studies below.  
In the Chorzów Factory case, the Permanent Court of International Justice laid down 
the principle that the duty to make reparations should “wipe out all consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed”.20 The content of the legal relationship which arises from state responsibility 
is described by the International Law Commission as entailing both “cessation of the wrongful 
act, and reparation for any injury done”.21 There are three different forms of reparation 
commonly recognized in international law. First, restitution, which means to restore the 
situation that existed before the breach, is the remedy identified by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice as preferable.22 Second, if it is not possible to achieve restitution, the 
injured party should receive compensation from the party at fault. That is, “payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear”.23 To this can be added losses 
that are not covered by compensation corresponding to the cost of restitution in kind. Third, 
some form of satisfaction is an option; a formal apology, an assurance that the action will not 
be repeated or a formal acceptance of responsibility.24 This option will be more readily referred 
to when damage is of a non-economic nature. These remedies are also reflected in the draft 
articles prepared by the International Law Commission.25 Monetary compensation is arguably 
the most realistic way of envisaging reparation after wartime damage, since it is not very likely 
for former belligerents to be able to cooperate in clean-up measures and since satisfaction 
cannot normally be considered an adequate remedy in cases where damage can be economically 
quantified. Therefore, this thesis will not treat restitution or satisfaction as available remedies, 
but instead focus on compensation. Further limiting the consideration of the contents of state 
responsibility, questions of implementation or circumstances precluding wrongfulness will not 
be treated within the scope of this thesis.   
To sum up, evaluating how well the remedy of compensation available under the law of 
state responsibility reflects the polluter pays principle can be said to include two levels. This 
two-leveled approach is reflected in the methodology of the thesis. First, an application of the 
                                                
20 Chorzów Factory Case, Judgment of 14 September 1928, PCIJ Series A, No. 17, p. 47.  
21 ILCDA, General commentary, p. 31, para 3(f). 
22 Chorzów Factory Case, p. 47.   
23 Ibid.  
24 Shaw, p. 586. 
25 ILCDA, articles 31 and 34–37.  
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substantive rules of international law protecting the environment in armed conflict will be done 
in both case studies. The applicable material rules will be assessed to see if and how a breach 
can be established, rendering compensation under the law of state responsibility or 
responsibility of non-state actors an available remedy. Second, based on the findings of the 
cases, the concluding analysis will evaluate to what extent the remedy of compensation made 
available under the law of state responsibility reflects the polluter pays principle.26  
 
1.2.3 Theoretical Understanding of the Polluter Pays Principle  
This section aims to clarify why it is relevant to evaluate to what extent available remedies 
reflect the polluter pays principle, as well as how the principle is understood for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
The polluter pays principle signifies that the person or entity responsible for 
environmental damage should bear the costs that follow. When approaching the area of 
international environmental law, the polluter pays principle is of significant importance. It 
influences the making of environmental law on both a domestic and an international level.27 
The principle was adopted at an international level for the first time in a 1972 council 
recommendation from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).28 It is now expressed in numerous environmental treaties.29 The principle is also 
included in the 1992 Declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development.30 
                                                
26 The reader is reminded that alternative remedies available under applicable MEAs will also be evaluated 
within the scope of the thesis.  
27 H.C. Bugge, “The Polluter Pays Principle: Dilemmas of Justice in National and International Contexts” in J. 
Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
pp. 411–428, at p. 411.  
28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the Council on Guiding 
Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies and Annex, 26 May 1972, 
C(72)128, Annex paras 2–5.   
29 See, for instance, the Preambles of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation (adopted 30 November 1990, entered into force 13 May 1995) 1891 UNTS 51 (OPRC Conven-
tion); the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances (adopted 15 March 2000, entered into force 14 June 2007) (OPRC Convention HNS 
Protocol); the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (adopted 9 April 
1992, entered into force 17 January 2000) 2099 UNTS 197 (Helsinki Convention), according to which the pol-
luter pays principle should be taken into account as a general principle of international law. The principle is also 
found in the operative paragraphs of, inter alia, the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natu-
ral Resources (adopted 9 July 1985), article 10(d); the Convention on the Protection of the Alps (adopted 7 Nov-
ember 1991, entered into force 6 March 1995) 1917 UNTS 135 (Alpine Convention), article 2(1); Convention 
for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (adopted 16 February 
1976, entered into force 12 February 1978, amended 10 June 1995, amended version entered into force 9 July 
2004) 1102 UNTS 27 (Barcelona Convention), article 4(3)(a). See De Sadeleer, N., Environmental Principles: 
From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 23f. for further examples.  
30 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (14 June 1992), UN Doc. 
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The polluter pays principle can be understood in different ways, and be said to have several 
functions.31 In its narrowest sense, it serves to allocate responsibility: if environmental damage 
occurs, the injuring party is held responsible for the costs of the clean-up.32 In a wider sense, it 
promotes the polluter’s full internalization of environmental costs. Moreover, it can serve as a 
principle regulating liability and compensation.33 It is in this third sense that the principle 
becomes interesting for the purposes of this thesis. Arguably, a widely recognized principle 
which serves to allocate responsibility for environmental harm, ought to be influential also on 
the rules allocating responsibility for environmental damage caused during armed conflict. 
Therefore, this thesis will consider to what extent the available remedies reflect the principle.  
At this point, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the status of the polluter pays principle in 
international law. Considering that it forms part of several core environmental treaties and also 
influences the national legislation of many states,34 its importance should not be understated. 
In fact, some scholars have considered that it may form part of customary international law.35 
If this were the case, an investigation into how well other rules of international law reflect the 
principle would be of limited value. If it forms part of customary international law, the polluter 
pays principle is directly applicable in its own right. However, in the environmental treaties 
where it is articulated, the principle is often vaguely phrased or not defined in precise terms. 
The principles which are encompassed in the Rio Declaration can be said to have the highest 
standing of international environmental legal principles.36 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration 
can therefore serve as a starting point in understanding the polluter pays principle:   
 
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental 
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest 
and without distorting international trade and investment.37  
                                                
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), 31 ILM 874, principle 16. Henceforth Rio Declaration.  
31 Bugge, pp. 411f.  
32 Ibid., p. 413.  
33 Ibid., p. 414. A duty for the party at fault to compensate the injured party has been expressed in for instance 
the Trail Smelter Case United States/Canada, Award of 11 March 1941, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Volume III (1941) pp. 1905–1982.  
34 De Sadeleer, pp. 32f.  
35 Shelton and Cutting suggest that “[t]he polluter pays principle is arguably a general principle of law, if not a 
norm of customary international law derived from Principle 21 [of the Stockholm Declaration]”, D. Shelton and 
I. Cutting, “If You Break It, Do You Own It? Legal Consequences of Environmental Harm from Military 
Activities”, 6 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies (2015), pp. 201–246, at pp. 245f. However, 
de Sadeleer points out that some authors have questioned “whether, in the current state of international law, the 
polluter-pays principle may be considered to constitute a rule of customary international law”, de Sadeleer, p. 25.  
36 See E. Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart, 2017), p. 71; P. 
Sands, “International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles” in W. Lang 
(ed.), Sustainable Development and International Law (Graham & Trotman, 1995), pp. 53–66, at p. 57.  
37 Rio Declaration, principle 16. Emphasis added.  
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The cautious wording suggests that states have objections towards applying the principle in an 
absolute sense at the international level. Consequently, relying on this principle as a rule of 
customary international law, especially in wartime, appears controversial. Beyerlin states that 
“only few environmental principles, if any, have cleared the hurdles of becoming norms of 
customary international law”.38 Regarding the polluter pays principle, both Beyerlin and Sands 
et al. consider it not to form part of customary international law.39  
Taking into account the multifaceted functions of the principle and the possible 
vagueness of its normative hierarchical status in international law, two elementary choices need 
to be made. The first choice is how to understand the nature and function of the polluter pays 
principle. Should it be understood as a simple method of providing corrective justice, or as a 
more complex principle capable of ensuring justice on several levels? The polluter pays 
principle has its basis in a notion of equity or justice.40 Shelton considers it arguable that equity 
is more important in environmental law than in any other area of international law, given the 
aim to fairly allocate “the benefits and burdens involved in natural resources and their 
protection”.41 She considers that seeking fair approaches in allocating such costs is not only 
based in morality, but “may also foster more effective action on issues of common concern”.42 
Therefore, this thesis will apply the polluter pays principle against the background of 
environmental justice theory, as will be elaborated on below in section 1.3.  
The second choice concerns where to place the polluter pays principle in the hierarchy 
of norms. Despite its name, it is useful to ask whether it perhaps should be considered a rule 
rather than a principle. According to Dworkin, there are three types of norms: policies, 
principles, and rules. While rules are applied in a sort of “all-or-nothing”-fashion and lead to a 
clear result, principles do not stipulate absolute consequences in themselves. Rather, a principle 
should be taken into account and provide guidance, when it is relevant.43 Considering that “the 
polluter should pay” is a straightforward statement stipulating a clear consequence for an 
                                                
38 U. Beyerlin, “Different Types of Norms in International Environmental Law: Policies, Principles and Rules” 
in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, 
electronic ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 425–448, at p. 438. 
39 Ibid., p. 441; P. Sands, J. Peel, A. Fabra and R. MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law, 
3rd edition (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 228ff.  
40 Shelton and Cutting, p. 246.  
41 D. Shelton, “Equity” in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law, electronic ed. (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 639–662, at pp. 651f.  
42 Ibid., p. 662.  
43 As Dworkin puts it: “the principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a 
consideration inclining in one direction or another”, R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977), p. 
26.  
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unwanted behavior, it may be considered that this principle is in fact a rule.44 However, as 
pointed out by de Sadeleer, the apparent simplicity of the polluter pays principle hides a number 
of ambiguities.45 As formulated in the Rio Declaration, the nature of the polluter pays principle 
does not seem absolute. Given the obligation to also take public interest and economic 
considerations into account, its application becomes more of a weighing exercise. Moreover, 
the polluter pays principle is often treated as just that – a principle. De Sadeleer highlights that 
it has “become a frame of reference for law-makers” forming “the conceptual basis for a range 
of legal instruments at the core of environmental legislation” and has been “used as an element 
of interpretation by the courts”.46 These circumstances lead to the conclusion that for the 
purposes of this thesis, it is more fitting to consider that the normative value of the polluter pays 
principle is that of a principle, rather than a rule.  
A principle can influence a rule at several stages: from the formulation of the rule to 
policy making based on the rule and onwards to its interpretation in administrative application 
or adjudication. On this note, Beyerlin states that  “principles can be understood as norms that 
are first and foremost designed to give guidance to their addressees for future conduct in rule-
making processes as well as to shape the interpretation and application of rules already in 
existence”.47 This thesis aims to treat the polluter pays principle as capable of influencing the 
making and interpretation of rules providing remedial measures for environmental damage. 
However, it should be noted that the aim of the thesis is not to see how well the principle is 
reflected in considerations of treaty-makers or adjudicators, but rather how well the potential 
outcomes, when applying the remedial measures, reflect the polluter pays principle.  
The considerable skepticism among scholars regarding the status of the polluter pays 
principle forming part of customary law speaks strongly against it. In addition, the scholars 
mentioned above who have considered that the principle might form part of customary law have 
not presented convincing evidence of state use based on opinio juris. The vagueness of the 
principle as expressed in the most widely ratified document where it appears, principle 16 of 
the Rio Declaration, also indicates that it is more fitting to treat the polluter pays principle as a 
general principle, rather than as having the status of customary international law. To sum up, 
this thesis will address the polluter pays principle as a tool capable of furthering environmental 
                                                
44 Beyerlin, p. 441. This is an assertion which does not seem to have gained wide adherence (yet). It can be noted 
that Sands et al., despite making reference to Beyerlin, do not mention the possibility that the normative status of 
the polluter pays principle should be that of a rule rather than a principle, Sands et al. pp. 228–233.  
45 De Sadeleer, p. 33.  
46 Ibid., p. 22.  
47 Beyerlin, p. 437.  
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justice. Rather than forming part of customary international law, it will be considered as a 
general principle which can, and should, inform more specific rules. As pointed out by Shelton 
and Cutting: “The imposition of a duty to compensate or remediate preventable harm is not 
only supported by general principles of environmental law (‘polluter pays’), but is in the interest 
of both the military and of protecting the environment.”48 
 
1.3 All is Fair in Love and War? Environmental Justice Theory   
As mentioned above, environmental justice theory can be used to further a more comprehensive 
understanding of the polluter pays principle, as a principle capable of ensuring justice on several 
levels. This section outlines what considerations of justice this thesis will take into account 
within its understanding of the principle.  
Falk argues that environmentalists have been lacking in applying a theory of 
environmental justice to international law, a failure which “tends to benefit the rich and 
powerful as well as those currently alive, and to accentuate the burdens and grievances of the 
poor and marginal, and the unborn”.49 Environmental justice is often understood as a concept 
that concerns the fair distribution of environmental assets within a population, regardless of 
their “race, color, culture, national origin, income, and educational levels”.50 Schlosberg 
endeavors to combine this focus on distribution with perspectives of ecological justice, in order 
to widen the perspective and encompass not only distributive justice.51 This more inclusive 
understanding of environmental justice is also adopted in Ebbesson and Okawa’s anthology 
Environmental Law and Justice in Context, which holds that current discourse on 
environmental justice includes aspects of distributive, corrective and procedural justice.52  
The idea of corrective justice was first formulated by Aristotle, and can be described as 
“the idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on another”.53 In the sense 
of corrective justice, inequality occurs when one party receives a gain and the other party a 
                                                
48 Shelton and Cutting, p. 244.  
49 R. Falk, “The Second Cycle of Ecological Urgency: An Environmental Justice Perspective” in J. Ebbesson 
and P. Okowa (eds.), Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 39–54, 
at p. 40.  
50 J. N. Gracia and H.K. Koh, “Promoting Environmental Justice”, 101:S1 American Journal of Public Health 
(2011), pp. 14–16, at p. 14.  
51 D. Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature, electronic ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 11.  
52 J. Ebbesson, “Introduction: Dimension of Justice in Environmental Law” in J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), 
Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 1–36 (2009), at p. 4.  
53 E.J. Weinrib, “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell”, 52 University of Toronto Law Review (2002), pp. 349–356, at 
p. 349.  
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corresponding loss.54 Corrective justice is done when the original position between the parties 
is re-established – it has a rectificatory function.55 Thus, in deciding on a remedy, the court 
should seek to undo the injustice done by one party to the other and to restore the situation as 
it was before the action that caused an unfair change.56 Furthermore, a corrective remedy should 
be aimed at both parties: it should not consist solely in compensating the party who has 
sustained an injury or solely in taking away the gain made by the injuring party.57 Corrective 
justice is the aspect which most readily comes to mind when examining the polluter pays 
principle. The party that has gained from causing environmental damage to another party should 
compensate the injured party, in order to ensure, as far as possible, that this party is put in the 
same position it would be in if the damage had not occurred. 
Rather than setting out that a party who has gained something from causing damage 
should make good this injustice to the injured party, distributive justice deals with the equal 
distribution of divisible qualities or goods.58 Justice in this sense should be based on the merits 
that each party has to the divisible good.59 Inequality occurs when the distribution does not 
measure up with the merits of the parties.60 In this case we are concerned with the distribution 
of the benefit of enjoying a high quality environment. The right to a clean and healthy 
environment is set out in numerous international treaties.61 However, it is evident that 
environmental quality is currently not evenly distributed between or within states. Regrettably, 
environmental degradation in armed conflict often takes place in locations where the 
environment is already fragile. In armed conflict, areas designated as protected zones due to 
their rich natural resources or their fragility are particularly vulnerable.62 Deciding on merits 
which could warrant people and states different rights to a clean environment appears to be an 
injustice in itself. This thesis will therefore use the assumption that all people and states should 
enjoy an equal right to a clean environment of the highest quality possible. In this sense, the 
                                                
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid., p. 350.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid, p. 349.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.   
61 For instance, the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986) 21 ILM 58, article 24 (African Charter); Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Adopted 17 November 1988, entered into 
force 16 November 1999) OAST No. 69, 28 ILM 161 (ESC Protocol), article 11. In addition, Shelton and 
Cutting point out that more than half of UN member states include such a provision among their constitutional 
guarantees, Shelton and Cutting, p. 230.   
62 Sjöstedt (2016), pp. 231f.  
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polluter pays principle should work not to enhance these inequalities by allowing environmental 
degradation in exchange for financial compensation. Instead, a fair remedy should work to 
reach a just distribution of environmental quality both within and between states, or at the very 
least not to enhance current inequality. 
 Procedural justice is most readily described as the access to a fair and effective tribunal, 
but it should also be considered that “the institutional arrangements must not be so complicated, 
time-consuming and costly that, while available in principle, the persons concerned are 
effectively barred for economic or social reasons from making use of them”.63 Procedural 
justice has been understood as instrumental for achieving justice also in the corrective and 
distributive senses.64 International law tends to be heavily centered on states. Ebbesson 
considers that a more proactive approach would be to assess corrective, distributive and 
procedural effects from the perspective of the individual in order to understand their effects 
within states.65 Here, it needs to be considered that in cases of pure ecological damage, the 
environment itself can be considered to be the injured party.66 The question of who is regarded 
as the injured party; a state, an individual or a community, or the environment itself, can 
influence the reflection of the polluter pays principle in the remedies available.  
In summary, this thesis will address the polluter pays principle based on a theory of 
environmental justice which includes three dimensions: corrective, distributive and procedural 
justice. This theoretical framework will enable viewing the chosen situations from a critical 
perspective and pointing to problems that go beyond the simplest understanding of the polluter 
pays principle. The polluter pays principle, understood as positioned in the intersection of the 
three considerations of environmental justice, should enable mechanisms for the injured party 
to receive reparations from the damaging party, work to enable fairness (or at least not enhance 
inequality) in distribution of environmental quality – both within and between states – and 
lastly, provide the possibility for an injured party to bring their case before a fair and effective 
tribunal. The thesis will investigate how well existing remedies in international law applicable 
to the bombing of the Jiyeh power station in 2006 and the ongoing conflict in the Niger Delta 
measure up with this standard. This investigation will enable an evaluation of the extent to 
which the remedies available for the chosen cases reflect the polluter pays principle, as 
                                                
63 J. Ebbesson, “Piercing the State Veil in Pursuit of Environmental Justice” in J. Ebbesson and P. Okowa (eds.), 
Environmental Law and Justice in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 270–293, at p. 276.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Ebbesson (2009), “Introduction: Dimension of Justice in Environmental Law”, p. 5.  
66 De Sadeleer, pp. 52f.  
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understood from a framework of environmental justice theory. The next section will elaborate 
on the case study method as well as how and why these two cases were chosen. 
 
1.4 Performing Qualitative Case Study Research: Method and Material 
In the initial phase of researching this topic, I noted that the intersection of the law of armed 
conflict and international environmental law is often discussed in hypothetical terms, 
sometimes far removed from the situations where they actually apply.67 This sparked my 
interest to look closer into two situations of environmental damage in armed conflict and see 
how the remedies available work when applied to real cases. There are numerous rules and 
remedies that may arguably be of relevance to a more general study on the topic.68 Performing 
a case study allows me to narrow down the scope of applicable rules. This is done by allowing 
the cases to work as identifiers of the relevant rules. The cases allow for a consideration of 
various possibilities, while still not claiming to evaluate all rules applicable to environmental 
damage in armed conflict. In addition, it should be noted that this thesis will not venture into 
the rules of international criminal law,69 or those of human rights law.70  
My case study is designed to identify the material rules that may give rise to 
responsibility for a state or a non-state actor. Based on the material available, an assessment 
will be made of whether or not, as well as how, a breach of these rules can be established in 
each of the two cases. Remedies offered by applicable MEAs will also be assessed for both 
cases. For reasons of context and coherence, these steps cannot be performed in an identical 
way in the two case studies. In the concluding analysis, an evaluation will be made of the extent 
to which the identified remedies reflect the polluter pays principle understood as encompassing 
considerations of corrective, distributive and procedural justice.  
 
                                                
67 A notable exception to this is the case study on the Virunga National Park performed by Sjöstedt (2016), pp. 
271–307. 
68 Especially considering the large amount of environmental treaties in force, which are not necessarily defunct 
in wartime. The number of MEAs in force has been estimated to between 500 and 700, Special Rapporteur M.G. 
Jacobsson, Third Report on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/700, 3 June 2016, para 100.   
69 The war crime encompassed in article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 90, is of potential relevance in an 
international armed conflict. It should be noted that neither of the cases in this treaty actualize this provision, 
since the unrest in the Niger Delta is not of an international character and since Israel has not ratified the Rome 
Statute.  
70 There are several rules aimed at protecting human rights, which are also influential on environmental 
protection. See section 4.2.3 on suggestions for further research. 
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1.4.1 Choosing the Cases 
Based on a model constructed by Flyvbjerg, it is useful for my study to identify examples of 
both the “most likely” and the “least likely” scenario to occur. 71 According to Flyvbjerg, the 
least likely case is useful mainly to gain more information on what is perceived to be unusual 
situations, and what happens in them.72 The most likely case is primarily useful in order to make 
logical deductions and to draw conclusions.73 In this context, including two cases of very 
different natures also has the potential of allowing for comparisons of what rules are applicable 
and if they reflect the polluter pays principle to different extents. This choice also serves to 
ensure that this thesis can be broad in identifying problems – both those that could have been 
foreseen by the lawmaker, since they are attached to the most likely case, and those which have 
been perceived as more improbable. Further, including two very different cases increases the 
possibility of making generalizations based on the findings. To some extent, falsification is 
another possible outcome. If the available remedies do not comply with the polluter pays 
principle even in the most likely case, it is unlikely that they will do so in very many other 
cases, since it is probable that the remedies have been constructed with this case in mind.  
When seeking to identify what the most and least likely cases might be, the perspective 
of the law-maker was used, in order to identify what scenario was envisaged as being the most 
likely when drafting the rules that are central to environmental protection in armed conflict. A 
breach of one of these rules can enable compensation under the law of state responsibility. As 
is familiar, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols lie at the center of the law 
of armed conflict. Provisions which aim to protect the environment specifically are found in 
article 35(3) and article 55 of Additional Protocol I.  
Article 35(3) reads: “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment” and article 55 reads:  
 
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-
term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means 
of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population. 
 
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited.74 
                                                
71 B. Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research”, 12:2 Qualitative Inquiry (2006), 
pp. 219–245, at p. 230.  
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid.  
74 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 
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Looking closer at these provisions, the criteria of intent or foreseeability presupposes that there 
is a clearly identifiable offender, capable of making an assessment of the damage that may be 
caused. Moreover, both provisions are only applicable in international armed conflict. It is clear 
that the scenario is a war between states and that the damage caused should be a direct result of 
the warfare waged by one, or both, of the parties.  
Considering the drafting of these provisions, the bombing of the storage tanks of the 
Lebanese Jiyeh power station by Israel in 2006 appears to fit with how the drafters of Additional 
Protocol I imagined the most likely scenario of environmental harm occurring in armed conflict. 
The bombing of the power station, introduced in greater detail in section 2 below, entails a 
conflict between two states, where the military actions of one directly inflicts harm on the 
environment of the other. It is difficult to say whether this type of scenario in reality is the most 
likely to occur, but it represents the type of situation that articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional 
Protocol I refer to. For this reason, precisely, it is interesting to study this case in order to 
investigate whether or not the available system of rules offers a solution that is compatible with 
the polluter pays principle.   
Going on to identify the case that is least likely to occur, I have chosen a case of civil 
unrest with several actors involved, where the allocation of responsibility is more complex. The 
struggle for control over natural resources in the Niger Delta is causing oil spills where the 
offender is not always easily identifiable. Is it the fault of the Nigerian Federal Government, 
who some argue are not implementing domestic laws on environmental protection effectively 
enough? Or might local armed groups be the main offender, accused of causing oil spills 
through hijacks and sabotage? Could the multinational oil corporations be to blame, who some 
claim are depleting the natural resources of the local population and not taking their 
responsibility for cleaning up spills caused by breakdowns of outdated equipment? In any case, 
the environmental damage caused in the conflict is vast. International law becomes relevant to 
this case to the extent that the situation meets the criteria for a non-international armed conflict, 
which will be elaborated on further in the case study. At first glance the cases of the Jiyeh power 
station and the Niger Delta conflict are similar in that they both concern oil spills, which might 
facilitate comparisons between them. However, the main reason for choosing these cases is that 
they are each other’s opposite: they represent the most likely case and the least likely case, 
respectively.  
                                                
(Additional Protocol I).  
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The Jiyeh power station case has been investigated through the lens of wartime 
environmental damage by several scholars before.75 By looking at the case through an 
environmental justice point of view and assessing the compatibility of the available remedies 
with the polluter pays principle, I hope to build on this research. The Niger Delta case has also 
been placed on the map of environmental law and conflict before, but most often as an example 
of how poor environmental policy and a struggle for natural resources can lead to conflict.76 
The impact of the conflict itself on the environment has often been overlooked.77 Further, while 
studies have concluded that Nigerian environmental law has not provided remedies to any 
considerable extent,78 scholars have not evaluated the remedies available under international 
law. In this sense, it is my expectation that this thesis will serve to fill a gap in the literature 
regarding these two cases.   
 
1.4.2 Reflections on the Case Study Method 
My choice of method has its basis in the initial wish to be able to look at real cases, rather than 
engage in hypothetical speculation on how the law might apply. In my opinion, there is a 
considerable strength in discussing environmental law and the law of armed conflict in a context 
not too far removed from the situations where they apply. This becomes especially important 
since my theoretical framework consists of environmental justice theory and the very concrete 
situations of how corrective, distributive, and procedural justice can be achieved. While the 
cases certainly serve as examples in a general discussion of the available remedies, I also hope 
that they can be illustrative of some of the difficulties met in situations that are similar to them.  
Using case studies as a method is sometimes criticized on the basis of the assumption 
that it is not possible to draw conclusions and generalize based on a single case, or in this 
context, on two cases. In response to this criticism, Flyvbjerg claims that the possibility to draw 
                                                
75 See, for instance, R. Falk and A. Ü. Bâli, “International Law at the Vanishing Point”, 241 Middle East Report 
(2006), pp. 34–41, 48; M.L. Tucker, “Mitigating Collateral Damage to the Environment in Naval Warfare: An 
Examination of the Israeli Naval Blockade of 2006”, 57 Naval Law Review (2013), pp. 161–202; and A. A. 
Takshe, I. Van der Molen and J. C. Lovett, “Examining the Lack of Legal Remedies for Environmental Damage 
in the 2006 Lebanon–Israel War”, 22 Environmental Policy and Governance (2012), pp. 27–41.  
76 See, for instance, A. O. Benedict, “Tragedy of Commons: Analysis of Oil Spillage, Gas Flaring and 
Sustainable Development of the Niger Delta of Nigeria”, 4:2 Journal of Sustainable Development (2011), pp. 
200–210; F. Allen, Implementation of Oil-Related Environmental Policy in Nigeria: Government Inertia and 
Conflict in the Niger Delta (Diss. University of Kwazulu-Natal, 2010); and E. E, Courson, Spaces of Insurgency: 
Petro-Violence and the Geography of Conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Diss. University of California, 
Berkeley, 2016). 
77 I.S. Ibaba, “Violent Conflicts and Sustainable Development in Bayelsa State”, 36:122 Review of African 
Political Economy (2009), pp. 555–573, at p. 555.  
78 See, for instance, Allen. 
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conclusions based on cases depends on how the cases have been chosen.79 This holds true for 
studies irrespective of the number of cases and the nature of the study – qualitative or 
quantitative.80 Flyvbjerg further holds that it is often possible to make generalizations based on 
a single case, if strategically chosen.81 Another common misconception of the case study-
method is the assumption that it is more subjective than other methods and therefore more prone 
to verification bias. However, this is yet another problem that cannot be considered to be 
particular for the case study-method.82 In fact, Flyvbjerg reaches the conclusion that the nature 
of the case study – coming close to the actual situation and being able to test hypotheses on 
phenomena as they play out in real life – tends to lead the scholar to question their preconceived 
notions and falsifying their hypothesis, rather than succumbing to verification bias.83 Therefore, 
subjectivity or lack of generalizability should be viewed as concerns not specific to the case 
study as such.   
Something which does, however, constitute a limitation to my research is the lack of 
first-hand information. Since I am not able to travel to either of the sites in order to conduct 
field studies, I will have to rely on secondary sources of information. This may prove especially 
difficult in the case of the Niger Delta. While UNEP has carried out field research in the 
Ogoniland region and UNDP touches on environmental issues in a human development 
assessment of the Niger Delta, the overall mapping of the environmental impacts of the conflict 
is admittedly sparse for this case. In contrast, the oil spill caused by the bombing of the storage 
tanks at Jiyeh Power Station has been meticulously mapped in post-conflict environmental 
impact assessments84 by UNEP and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and through 
two estimations of the economic impact by the World Bank.  
 
1.4.3 Material and Applicable Legal Sources  
The material used in the case studies has been found through searches on the Gothenburg 
University search engine on different combinations of the terms: “Niger Delta”, “conflict”, “oil 
                                                
79 Flyvbjerg, p. 225.  
80 Ibid., pp. 224f.   
81 Ibid., p. 228.  
82 Ibid., pp. 234f. 
83 Ibid., pp. 235f. 
84 UNEP defines the purpose of post-conflict environmental assessments as seeking “to provide an objective 
scientific assessment of the environmental situation in a country immediately following a conflict. They aim to 
inform the general public on environmental risks associated with the conflict, and to provide guidance to local 
government on priority issues to be addressed. They also help the international community to channel funding 
and technical assistance to the key areas of environmental management”. UNEP, “Lebanon Post-Conflict 
Environmental Impact Assessment” (UNEP, Kenya, 2007), p. 26.  
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spill” “Orashi”, “Apoi”85, “environment”, “armed groups”, “oil companies”, “polluter pays”, 
“remedies” and “Jiyeh”, “environment”, “Lebanon war 2006 [or] Israel–Lebanon war [or] 
Israel–Hezbollah war”, and “oil spill”, “polluter pays”, “remedies” respectively. Naturally, 
these searches generated an abundance of results in the form of inter alia books, articles, reports 
and essays. When choosing what material to use for my study, a method of sequential criteria-
based selection was used throughout the research.86 This means that information was valued 
based on how well it related to the purpose of the thesis, and that material was collected 
continuously – often material was found through using the references of another source.  
In order to obtain trustworthy material, material from official sources, such as articles 
published in academic journals and dissertations, has been prioritized. Environmental impact 
assessments and economic assessments conducted by established actors have also been of great 
importance. In the case of the Niger Delta conflict, there are not as many assessments by 
established actors conducted in the subject area of my thesis. Reliance on un-published 
academic works and on news media sources is therefore greater in this case study. I have sought 
to lessen this shortcoming by confirming information in various sources. News media-searches 
were made for both cases using the same search terms as stated above.  
Regarding the legal sources applicable to the cases, I have identified a series of relevant 
provisions under the law of armed conflict: articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I, 
thereto related rules of customary international law, and the general principles of military 
necessity, distinction and proportionality. The MEAs identified as relevant are the 1971 Ramsar 
Convention on the protection of wetlands, the 1976 Barcelona Convention and the 1981 
Abidjan Convention, both aiming inter alia to reduce marine pollution from oil spills. The legal 
sources raise questions of the applicability of MEAs in wartime and how to treat a situation 
where the obligations under an MEA contradict those of the law of armed conflict, which will 
be addressed below.    
 
  
                                                
85 Upper Orashi Forests and Apoi Creek Forests are the designated Ramsar sites in the Delta region. Information 
available at http://www.ramsar.org/wetland/nigeria.  
86 S. B. Merriam, Fallstudien som forskningsmetod (Studentlitteratur, 1994), pp. 61–64.  
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2. The Jiyeh Power Station  
Plant personnel estimated that approximately 60,000 m3 of fuel oil may have burned as a 
worst case scenario. A total quantity of heavy fuel oil in the order of 15,000 m3
 
is assumed 
to have spilled to the sea, causing one of the major environmental disasters experienced by 
Lebanon.87  
2.1 Introducing the Case: “…an oil slick that covered the entirety of the 
Lebanese coastline”88 
The armed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah taking place between 12 July and 14 August 
of 2006 was precipitated by Hezbollah fighters firing diversionary missiles into Israeli border 
towns and infiltrating the border, killing soldiers and injuring civilians. Two soldiers were taken 
hostage by Hezbollah, who demanded the release of Lebanese soldiers captured by Israel. Israel 
held the Lebanese government accountable for the kidnappings and the raids, since the 
operations were carried out from Lebanese territory and since two representatives of Hezbollah 
were serving in the government. These events prompted Israeli aerial bomb raids of both 
Hezbollah and Lebanese targets, and a ground invasion of south Lebanon. Meanwhile, 
Hezbollah conducted guerrilla warfare, primarily through launching rockets into northern 
Israel.89   
During the conflict, one of the most high-profile incidents was the Israeli bombing of 
the storage tanks at Jiyeh electric power plant, located 30 km south of Beirut. On 13 and 15 
July the storage tanks of Jiyeh were targeted by two strikes from the Israeli Airforce and a 
subsequent estimate of 12–15,000 tons of oil were spilled into the Mediterranean Sea.90 The 
spill resulted in a 150 km long oil slick along the Lebanese coastline and into the Syrian Arab 
Republic.91 Israel proceeded to impose a maritime blockade, rendering it difficult for Lebanon 
to mitigate the effects of the spill until the month of September 2016.92 The results were 
                                                
87 UNDP, “Lebanon Rapid Environmental Assessment for Greening Recovery Reconstruction and Reform” 
(UNDP, Lebanon, 2007), p. xv.  
88 UN General Assembly Resolution 69/212 of 19 December 2014 “Oil Slick on Lebanese Shores”, UN Doc. 
A/RES/69/212, 28 January 2015, preambular para 5.   
89 C. Urquhart, “Computerized Weaponry and High Morale”, The Guardian (11 August 2006), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/aug/11/syria.israel, accessed 7 April 2017; G. Myre and S. Erlanger, 
“Clashes Spread to Lebanon as Hezbollah raids Israel”, International Herald Tribune (12 September 2006), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090129193940/http://iht.com/articles/2006/07/13/africa/web.0712mideast.php, 
accessed 7 April 2017.  
90 UNDP, “Report on the Measurement & Quantification of the Environmental Damage of the Oil Spill on 
Lebanon” (UNDP Lebanon, 2014), para. 1.   
91 Ibid. See Figure 1 in the Annex to this thesis for a map illustrating the extent of the spill. 
92 Ibid.  
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devastating to the already fragile environment of Lebanon.93 The UN General Assembly stated 
that the spill “heavily polluted the shores of Lebanon and consequently had serious implications 
for human health, biodiversity, fisheries…”.94 The environmental harm has been assessed by 
several actors, such as UNEP, UNDP, and the Government of Lebanon.95 The World Bank has 
published two studies quantifying the cost of the damage caused by the the oil spill.96 Thus, 
there is plenty of material to assess the effects of the oil spill and even to quantify the damage 
in economic terms.   
Some delimitations to this case have to be made in order to reach meaningful results in 
assessing the compatibility of the available remedies with the polluter pays principle. There are 
several aspects to this conflict that are better investigated in other contexts. For instance, Israel’s 
right to self-defense under the rules of jus ad bellum and how such a right applies towards 
Lebanese targets and Hezbollah targets respectively. The harm done to the civilian population: 
1,200 deaths, over 4,400 injured and a quarter of the population in displacement,97 as well as 
destruction of infrastructure and housing, benefits studies from a human rights in armed conflict 
perspective. Further, the Hezbollah bombings of Israeli forests causing 2,000 acres of woodland 
to burn to the ground, described by the Israeli government as “an ecological disaster” estimated 
to take 50–60 years before reaching full recovery,98 is another instance of environmental 
damage in armed conflict that could benefit from further research elsewhere. Lastly, the damage 
done to the environment of the Syrian Arab republic has been excluded here, in order to fully 
focus on the relationship between Israel and Lebanon.  
 
2.2 State Responsibility 
After the oil spill, clean-up and restoration of the Lebanese coast line was carried out by the 
Government of Lebanon, members of the international community, as well as actors from the 
                                                
93 M. Sarraf, L. Croitoru, M. El Fadel, K. El-Jisr, E. Ikäheimo, E. Grundlach and S. Al-Duaij, “Oil Spill and 
Waste due to Conflict: The Case of Lebanon” in L. Croitoru L. and M. Sarraf (eds.) The Cost of Environmental 
Degradation – Case Studies from the Middle East and North Africa (World Bank, 2010), pp. 89–145, at p. 89.  
94 UN General Assembly Resolution 61/194 of 20 December 2006 “Oil Slick on Lebanese Shores”, UN Doc. 
A/RES/61/194, 6 February 2007, para 2. 
95 A table of organizations who performed damage assessments after the end of hostilities is found in World 
Bank, “Republic of Lebanon Economic Assessment of Environmental Degradation Due to July 2006 
Hostilities”, Report No. 39787-LB (World Bank Sustainable Development Department, Middle East and North 
Africa Region, 2007), p. 5.  
96 World Bank (2007) and Sarraf et al., see p. xii.  
97 Sarraf et al., p. 89.  
98Jewish National Fund, “More Press for JNF’s Work in the North” (9 August 2006), available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081120221045/http://www.jnf.net/blogs/securityblanket/2006/08/more_press_for
_jnfs_work_in_th/, accessed 5 May 2017.  
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civil society.99 A conservative estimate by the World Bank put the cost of clean-up operations, 
loss of biodiversity, damage to protected sites as well as losses of revenues from inter alia 
fishing, tourism and natural resources at US $203.1 million.100 The costs of the spill are also 
reflected in the UN General Assembly resolutions estimating the value of the damage incurred 
by Lebanon at US $856.5 million and requesting Israel to pay adequate compensation.101 This 
estimation, based on a report by the UN Secretary-General, also includes the passive use value 
of coastal resource and is adjusted for inflation and interest.102 Could Israel be obligated under 
the law of state responsibility to provide compensation for these losses?  
As stated above, under the law of state responsibility an internationally wrongful act 
entails an act or omission which is attributable to the state and which constitutes a breach of a 
rule of international law that is binding on that state.103 In this context, there is little point in 
dwelling on the attribution of the acts to the state; the bombing of the tanks at Jiyeh power 
station was carried out by the Israeli state air force on behalf of the state of Israel. The 
responsibility of a state for actions carried out by its military is reflected in article 3 of the 1907 
Hague Convention IV, in article 91 of Additional Protocol I, and also recognized as part of 
customary international law.104 In short, the act is attributable to the state of Israel. What is 
more interesting is to consider whether or not the environmental damage caused constitutes an 
internationally wrongful act. Thus, the availability of compensation under state responsibility 
hinges on an interpretation of the material rules of international law that are applicable in 
relation to wartime environmental damage.  
Taking into consideration the facts of the case, the material rules of the law of armed 
conflict that are most relevant are the prohibition to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the environment, the obligation to pay due regard to the environment in military 
operations, and the obligation to apply the principles of distinction, necessity and 
proportionality in warfare. In addition, the Barcelona Convention on environmental protection 
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of the Mediterranean Sea is relevant. Whether the application of these instruments to the case 
can give rise to compensation under the law of state responsibility, or other remedies, is 
investigated in subsections 2.3–2.5 below.  
 
2.3 The Prohibition of Widespread, Long-term and Severe Environmental 
Damage and the Obligation of Paying Due Regard to the Environment 
This section will apply two rules that both provide direct environmental protection during 
armed conflict: the prohibition to cause widespread, long-term and severe environmental 
damage and the obligation of paying due regard to the environment. Since these rules are similar 
in origin and nature, they will be discussed jointly below.  
 
2.3.1 Source of the Rules   
The aftermath of the environmental destruction caused in the Vietnam war, combined with a 
growing awareness of environmental issues during the 1970s brought considerations of 
environmental protection in wartime into the negotiations of Additional Protocol I.105 As a 
result, articles 35(3) and 55 of Additional Protocol I deal directly with environmental damage 
in wartime.106 Additional Protocol I is applicable in international armed conflict. In Tadić, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirmed the already 
prevailing opinion that an international armed conflict is at hand “whenever there is a resort to 
armed forces between states”.107 This means that any level of hostile violence between the 
armed forces of two states is enough to establish that an international armed conflict is taking 
place. Clearly, this is the case at hand. However, Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I. 
Hence, articles 35(3) and 55(1) of the Protocol are not binding on Israel. Only if these rules 
form part of customary international law could a breach be used as a basis for state 
responsibility.  
Okowa argues that article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I is widely recognized as forming 
part of customary international law.108 Support for this statement is also offered by the 
Customary International Humanitarian Law Study conducted by the International Committee 
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for the Red Cross (ICRC),109 which prohibits “[t]he use of methods or means of warfare that 
are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment” in the first sentence of rule 45.110 According to the ICRC, since the 
adoption of Additional Protocol I “significant practice has emerged to the effect that this 
prohibition has become customary”.111 The prohibition is set forth in military manuals and 
constitutes an offence in many states, including in states that are not parties to Additional 
Protocol I.112 Sjöstedt also points out that many scholars tend to treat the rule formulated by the 
ICRC Customary Law Study as part of customary law.113  In 2005, Bothe even considered that 
given the increase in attestation to environmental damage in war and persistent criticism of 
restrictive interpretations of the rule, a customary rule which awards higher environmental 
protection than the rule contained in article 35(3) of Additional Protocol I might have 
developed.114  
However, there is also evidence to the contrary. The United States, France and the 
United Kingdom have denied that the prohibition forms part of customary international law.115 
The fact that these states are large military powers could speak against the formation of a rule. 
Nevertheless, the ICRC Customary Law Study points out that these states have not been entirely 
consistent in their position. In some contexts, particularly their military manuals, practice 
indicates that the rule is binding so far as it does not apply to nuclear weapons.116 The study 
also holds that the United States, France and the United Kingdom cannot be considered 
specially affected states in relation to the application of this rule to conventional weapons. Since 
custom does not have to be entirely uniform for a rule of customary international law to exist, 
the objections are “not enough to have prevented the emergence of this customary rule”.117 
Lastly, it is possible that rather than preventing the emergence of a rule of customary 
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international law, these countries are to be regarded as persistent objectors to the rule.118 
Regarding the obligation that “[c]are shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage” found in article 55(1) of 
Additional Protocol I, the ICRC has formulated a related obligation in rule 44: 
 
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protection and 
preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military operations, all feasible 
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental damage to the 
environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on the environment of certain 
military operations does not absolve a party to the conflict from taking such precautions.119 
 
At first glance, rule 44 of the ICRC Customary Law Study seems reflective of the rule 
encompassed in article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I. However, the customary rule is phrased 
in terms of “paying due regard” rather than “taking care” and does not include the requirement 
of widespread, long-term and severe damage. Hulme holds that the customary rule to pay due 
regard sets a lower standard than the obligation to take care found in article 55(1); it simply 
obliges belligerents to balance the interest of protecting the environment with that of military 
interests.120 Sjöstedt argues that despite this, the customary rule provides higher protection, 
since the threshold requirement is omitted.121 Regarding its status as customary international 
law, Hulme expresses doubts,122 and Sjöstedt draws the conclusion that while it is most likely 
that a rule obligating states to pay attention to the environment during warfare exists, its 
contents are not clear.123 Sjöstedt also points out that while states are generally unwilling to 
adopt new environmental regulation within the law of armed conflict, their practice shows a 
growing trend of paying regard to the environment.124 In addition, Koppe supports the 
conclusion of the ICRC that a customary rule with this content has developed.125 
In conclusion, scholarly support for whether, and if so how, to treat these rules as 
customary law is not uniform. All scholars do not consider their exact content to be clear, but 
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evidence of their existence is considerable. Moreover, special weight should be afforded to the 
ICRC Customary Law Study, which was conducted with a mandate from the international 
community and has been widely used by practitioners, academics, courts, governments, and 
UN organs to identify custom.126 In the following, the prohibition of widespread, long-term and 
severe environmental damage in war and the obligation of paying due regard to the environment 
will therefore be treated as forming part of customary international law. Hence, a breach of 
either one of these obligations in the case at hand could give rise to state responsibility.  
 
2.3.2 The Prohibition of Widespread, Long-term and Severe Environmental Damage  
This section will provide an application of the customary rule prohibiting widespread, long-
term and severe environmental damage to the case of the oil spill at Jiyeh power station. At the 
outset, it should be noted that this rule has never been interpreted by a court in either its treaty-
form or as customary law. This constitutes a considerable difficulty when seeking to apply the 
rule. An additional difficulty is that most scholars addressing the prohibition have done so in 
relation to the provision found in Additional Protocol I. Here, the customary rule is to be 
applied. However, the first sentence of rule 45 of the ICRC Customary Law Study is formulated 
“The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is prohibited.”127 It is, in 
effect, a replication of the prohibition found in both article 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional 
Protocol I. Regardless of whether relying on the ICRC formulation or not, the rule of customary 
international law has arisen out of the treaty provision, or at least in close relationship to it. It 
could therefore be assumed to have roughly the same content.128 Sources interpreting the 
prohibition in Additional Protocol I are therefore of relevance to an assessment of the customary 
rule as well.   
The first requirement of the rule is for the damage to be caused by means or methods of 
warfare. According to the ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, “methods and means” 
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refers to weapons in a broad sense, as well as the way they are used.129 This is fairly easily 
established in the case at hand, since the oil spill is a direct result of a chosen method of warfare: 
aerial bombings targeting the storage tanks of a power plant. The method employed could 
therefore be unlawful, if the other criteria are fulfilled. Second, the use of the words “intended, 
or may be expected, to cause” implies that intent is not necessary; foreseeable collateral damage 
is included as well. The ICRC Commentary confirms that the provision protects the 
environment against effects which are incidental.130 The assessment of what constitutes 
foreseeable collateral damage should be based on information available at the time of the 
attack.131 Given that large-scale oil spills have occurred numerous times in the past, with ample 
proof of their detrimental effect on the environment,132 and the fact that the tanks where located 
within approximately 30 meters of the shoreline,133 it seems unlikely that the environmental 
consequences of bombing the storage tanks should not have been foreseeable.  
Turning now to the cumulative threshold of widespread, long-term and severe. In terms 
of being widespread, several reports examining the effects of the oil spill state that it covered 
an area of approximately 150 km along the coastline.134 The precise area is more difficult to 
ascertain, but UNDP report that an early estimation totaled 143.438 km2 of shore affected.135 
The estimation cannot be considered to reflect the entire spread of oil contamination on the 
shores, as it only includes sites investigated by the Lebanese Ministry of Environment shortly 
after the spill and exact measurements were not available for all investigated sites.136 To the 
damage on shores can be added the less readily quantifiable amounts of oil that sunk to the 
seabed. UNEP reports that “a substantial part of the oil released from the tanks sank to the 
bottom of the sea in the immediate vicinity of the power plant, most likely smothering the biota 
in the sediment and significantly affecting the seabed at Jiyeh”.137 In addition, the bombings 
caused oil fires burning for 27 continuous days which generated a “plume of smoke reportedly 
reaching 60 km”.138  
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The ICRC commentary on Additional Protocol I does not provide an elaboration on how 
“widespread” should be defined, and neither does the ICRC Customary Law study. Hulme and 
Sjöstedt both suggest turning to the 1976 ENMOD Convention,139 which contains a provision 
with a similar threshold for damage: “widespread, longlasting or severe”.140 For the purposes 
of ENMOD, widespread has been defined as “several hundred square kilometres”.141 Relying 
on this interpretation, the damage caused could probably be considered to be widespread in the 
meaning of the rule.   
The requirement that the damage has to be long-term also poses some difficulties to 
assess. The effect over time of an oil spill is notoriously difficult to measure, and time frames 
may vary widely depending on the quantity and type of oil as well as the type of ecosystem 
affected by the spill.142 Shortly after the conflict, the World Bank and UNDP provided estimates 
that the serious impact on marine biodiversity from the oil spill might last between ten to fifty 
years.143 The catastrophic impact on shores was expected to last between one to ten years.144 
These estimates are also referred to in the UNDP valuation from 2014 of the costs of the oil 
spill.145 In 2015, the UN General Assembly concluded that “Lebanon is still engaged in the 
treatment of wastes and the monitoring of recovery” due to the spill.146 In the context of article 
35(3) of Additional Protocol I, “long-term” has often been interpreted to mean several decades. 
This interpretation is the result of some participants expressing this view at the diplomatic 
conference regarding the adoption of the Additional Protocols.147 Sjöstedt argues that it is 
problematic that this view should be considered authoritative, since it does not reflect a 
consensus reached among the drafters.148 Instead, she suggests that the rule found in Additional 
Protocol I could be interpreted in light of the definition of “longlasting” for the purposes of the 
ENMOD Convention,149 which entails “a period of months, or approximately a season”.150 
However, this reasoning is based on the treaty interpretation rules of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and is therefore difficult to directly transfer to a 
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rule of customary international law.151 At present, evidence of state use and opinio juris that 
reflects state practice which defines long-term as a period of months, does not exist. 
In its final report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War, the US Department of 
Defense questioned whether the damage caused by the burning of oil wells lived up to the 
requirement of being long-term, since the prohibitions “in Protocol I were not intended to 
prohibit battlefield damage caused by conventional operations”.152 Using this line of reasoning, 
the damage caused by Israel in Lebanon would arguably also be excluded from the scope of 
application. However, there is reason to be critical of this assessment. The interpretation is 
based on a statement which was made at the diplomatic conference in relation to “short-term 
damage, such as artillery bombardment”.153 This brings to mind the image of the environment 
being directly affected by the use of conventional weapons, for instance, by limited artillery 
bombardment of a forested area affecting the fauna and flora at the site. It appears arbitrary to 
equate this scenario with the collateral damage of vast amounts of oil spilling into the sea. 
Moreover, if the two are to be equated, the environmental damage covered by the rule 
diminishes to the point where it is difficult to see that anything would be protected. Especially 
considering that it is questionable whether the rule at all covers damage from non-conventional 
weapons.154 This simply cannot be the intention of the drafters of Additional Protocol I, nor the 
content of the customary rule. Its exact content, however, remains unclear. If interpreted to 
mean several decades, the damage caused by the oil spill might live up to this requirement. As 
noted above, some estimations have anticipated damage lasting for as long as fifty years. 
Another area of interpretation that remains cloudy is how serious the long-term damage is 
required to be. If the most critically pressing issues are dealt with relatively quickly, but 
aftereffects on ecosystems and biodiversity are felt for a period of several decades, does that 
live up to the threshold requirement?  
Lastly, an evaluation of whether or not the damage is severe needs to be carried out. The 
effects of the oil spill in Lebanon are commonly characterized as an environmental disaster.155 
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The Palm Islands Nature Reserve, a “unique ground for spawning fish and sponges” and “a 
resting area for rare and globally endangered migratory birds” was one of the sites that were 
seriously impacted by the spill.156 In their rapid recovery report, UNDP utilized a scale for 
assessing environmental damage caused in the conflict, allowing it to be classified as negligible, 
marginal, critical-nonsignificant, critical-significant, serious, or severe.157 The assessment 
includes two elements: impact effect and duration.158 The impact effect on sensitive ecosystems 
due to the oil spill is classified as “serious”, and considering the estimate of 10–50 years 
duration, this damage is considered “severe”.159 Similarly, the impact of oil pollution on shores 
is classified as “catastrophic” and although its impact is only expected to last for 1–10 years, 
the damage is concluded to be “severe”.160 In addition, UNEP recognizes that the burning oil 
fires released toxic pollutants which “could be expected to cause a significant degree of 
environmental pollution”.161 Although this was probably among the most serious 
environmental impacts of the conflict, UNEP was not able to scientifically determine the 
environmental impact due to a lack of data.162  
The UNDP classification of the damage as “severe” does not mean that the damage is 
necessarily to be considered severe in the meaning of the legal term. The US Department of 
Defense considered the damage done in the Gulf War to be severe in the layman’s sense, but 
not necessarily in the legal sense intended by the term in Additional Protocol I.163 However, the 
meaning of the legal term is not defined in the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I, nor 
in the ICRC Customary Law Study. Despite the strong wording of the impact assessment 
carried out by the UNDP, the severity of the damage in relation to the applicable rule is therefore 
exceedingly difficult to assess.  
Evidently, it is difficult even to assess whether or not environmental damage that has 
been carefully mapped and evaluated lives up to the threshold. Indeed, the threshold 
requirements have been criticized for being both unclear and setting a too high standard.164 The 
case of the Jiyeh Power station oil spill confirms this conclusion. 
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2.3.3 The Obligation to Pay Due Regard to the Environment 
Based on the previous conclusion that the obligation to pay due regard to the environment in 
military operations forms part of customary international law, it is theoretically also a basis for 
state responsibility. The requirement to pay due regard to the environment is an obligation of 
conduct, which could serve to ensure that military operations putting the environment at risk 
are preceded by, for instance, an environmental impact assessment. Considering that 
environmental damage was foreseeable, it is arguable that Israel may have violated its 
obligation to pay due regard to the environment in conducting the operation. It should be noted 
that due regard is to be paid irrespective of the level of damage anticipated. However, as Hulme 
points out, if the expected damage is low, the regard paid to the environment can be equally 
low.165 In this case, however, considerable damage to the environment ought to have been 
expected. Accordingly, a high level of regard should have been paid towards protecting the 
environment in carrying out the military operation. Hulme considers that the obligation to pay 
due regard to the environment in practice involves a balancing exercise in the use of means and 
methods of warfare, which takes into account the need for environmental protection.166 Other 
than this, she considers that the rule is “quite vague about what states need to do” to make sure 
that due regard is paid.167 Whether or not such regard to the environment was paid is therefore 
difficult to speculate on, but it would have to be proved for the remedies under state 
responsibility to become available.  
Therefore, while in theory offering a different kind of protection than the protection 
offered by the prohibition of widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage, it is also 
difficult to base state responsibility on the obligation to pay due regard to the environment in 
military operations.  
 
2.4 The Duty to Apply the Principles of Military Distinction, Necessity, and 
Proportionality 
General rules of military conduct can also serve to indirectly protect the environment in armed 
conflict. Consensus is high that the principles of military distinction, necessity, and 
proportionality form part of customary international law.168 Sjöstedt argues that these rules 
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provide the environment with broader protection than the rule prohibiting excessive 
environmental damage examined in section 2.3.2.169 This can be explained through the fact that 
even when damage is not widespread, long-term and severe, these principles still have to be 
applied.  
The principle of distinction obliges belligerents to differentiate between military and 
civilian targets in order not to direct attacks against civilian objects.170 It is possible that the 
Jiyeh power plant should be considered a valid military target. Many objects which are intended 
for civilian use can also be used for military purposes; roads and bridges utilized by civilians 
can also be vital to support a military effort, thereby constituting valid military targets.171 The 
same holds true for a power plant, providing electrical power to both civilians and military 
efforts. Relying on the ICRC List of Categories of Military Objectives, the legitimacy hinges 
on whether or not the fuel contained in the tanks was mainly used for military consumption.172 
Israel has claimed that the site was targeted as “a broader campaign against infrastructure used 
by Hezbollah guerillas”,173 but allegations have also been made that the power station in fact 
had few ties to the Hezbollah guerilla movement.174   
As established by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion  
“[r]espect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is 
in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality”.175 Considering first the 
principle of necessity, the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I considers that violence 
above “the level which is strictly necessary to ensure the success of a particular operation in a 
particular case” is not permitted.176 Sjöstedt points out that the application of the principle 
demands an understanding of the attacker’s motive, as well as the military advantage 
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anticipated in carrying out the attack.177 If relying on the following statement from the Israeli 
government, the objective in bombing the Jiyeh power plant was to reduce the supply of fuel to 
Hezbollah: 
 
Terrorist activity is dependent, inter alia, on a regular supply of fuel without which the 
terrorists cannot operate. For this reason a number of fuel depots which primarily serve the 
terrorist operations were targeted. From intelligence Israel has obtained, it appears that this 
step has had a significant effect on reducing the capability of the terrorist organizations.178 
 
Considering the aim of the operation and the resulting military advantage claimed by Israel, it 
may have been acceptable under the principle of necessity to bomb the tanks at the power plant. 
Regarding what amount of anticipated military advantage gives rise to military necessity, 
Leibler has argued that considerable uncertainty prevents the principle “from operating in 
practice as a deterrent”.179 In sum, the necessity to perform an attack must be based on the 
attacker’s objective of gaining a military advantage, but the uncertainty in the level of military 
advantage required makes it difficult to establish a breach unless it is clear that an attack could 
not be anticipated to bring military advantage. If the tanks tanks did constitute a legitimate 
military target based on their supply of fuel to the Hezbollah, the goal of the Israeli army to cut 
off fuel supplies leads to the conclusion that such clarity is not the case here.   
Even if an attack is directed against a military objective and is necessary to conduct, it 
is prohibited if it may be expected to cause damage to civilian objects which is disproportionate 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.180 Koppe argues that this principle 
gives rise to a rule of customary international law prohibiting excessive collateral 
environmental damage in an international armed conflict,181 and the ICRC Customary Law 
Study confirms that attacks that may be expected to cause collateral environmental damage 
which is excessive in relation to the “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” is 
prohibited.182 Given that the assessment of a military advantage is not restricted to the gains of 
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a particular operation, but also considers the context of the war strategy in its entirety,183 it is 
often difficult to ascertain whether collateral damage is disproportionate. Sjöstedt also points 
out that since the test is to be performed based on knowledge available at the time of launching 
an attack, the difficulties in predicting the scale and effect of environmental damage 
complicates the assessment.184 In this case, it is arguable that not much prior knowledge other 
than that the tanks contain oil, that they are in close proximity with the shoreline and that 
massive oil spills typically have a detrimental effect on the marine environment is needed to 
understand that significant collateral environmental damage would ensue.185 However, in 
balancing the expected collateral damage with the military objective, it must be noted that these 
values are not homogenous.186 Rather, a comparison between the military value of denial of 
fuel to the enemy and the environmental value of avoiding severe impact on a fragile marine 
ecosystem, is confounded due to the inherent dissimilarity in these values. Schmitt concludes 
that applying the principle of proportionality “absent a common currency against which to 
measure dissimilar values” proves difficult.187 In addition to an inherent dissimilarity, Sjöstedt 
notes that environmental values “have not been properly accommodated in the proportionality 
assessment”.188 
In conclusion, even though these principles do not require the environmental damage 
caused to be widespread, long-term and severe, they attribute high weight to military objectives 
in relation to other values worthy of protection. While is possible that the Jiyeh power plant 
was not a legitimate military target, and even if it was, that the collateral environmental damage 
was disproportionate, a definitive conclusion is difficult to draw.  
 
2.5 Multilateral Environmental Agreements  
2.5.1 Applying Multilateral Environmental Agreements in International Armed Conflict 
The International Court of Justice has held that since the law of armed conflict is specially 
designed for dealing with situations of armed conflict, it applies as lex specialis when there is 
a normative conflict with peacetime law.189 The application of the law of armed conflict as lex 
specialis has sparked considerable debate regarding whether or not MEAs concluded in 
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peacetime continue to apply when an armed conflict breaks out.190 The International Court of 
Justice has stated that “the international law on the environment does not cease to apply once 
an armed conflict breaks out”.191 Further, in its work on the topic Effects of Armed Conflict on 
Treaties, the International Law Commission has stated that the outbreak of armed conflict does 
not ipso facto terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty.192 In fact, treaties concerning 
international environmental protection are presumed to continue to apply.193 MEAs which do 
not contain an express provision providing for their disapplication in the event of hostilities 
breaking out, can therefore be presumed to continue to apply to the extent that they do not 
contradict the law of armed conflict, which applies as lex specialis.   
Scholars are of different views regarding how useful MEAs are when it comes to the 
protection of the environment in armed conflict. Critique has been directed towards the lack of 
concrete obligations.194 Sjöstedt takes a different view and argues that the vague phrasing is a 
result of MEAs being drafted as flexible frameworks, offering a system through which the state 
party can determine what the appropriate action is, sometimes with the help of decisions or 
recommendations of a treaty body.195 Practically all MEAs create some form of institution for 
long-term cooperation between parties.196 Therefore, while the lack of concrete and specific 
obligations in MEAs can make it difficult to base state responsibility on them,197 they could 
offer other types of remedies.   
 
2.5.2 The Barcelona Convention 
Both Israel and Lebanon are parties to the 1978 Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean (Barcelona Convention), aiming, 
inter alia, to protect the Mediterranean Sea and its coastal environment from pollution. It does 
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not contain any provisions excluding its application in armed conflict. In accordance with the 
line of reasoning above, it is therefore presumed to stay in force between the parties to the extent 
that it does not contradict the law of armed conflict.  
After the Jiyeh power station oil spill, a request of support in accordance with article 12 
of the Emergency Protocol to the Barcelona Convention, was quickly answered by ten of the 
contracting parties.198 The Convention also serves as the legal framework for the Mediterranean 
Action Plan under UNEP (UNEP-MAP). The Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response 
Centre (REMPEC) under UNEP-MAP was significantly involved in responding to the spill and 
the clean-up which sought to remediate its consequences. In fact, the “reliable national systems 
for preparedness and response” which REMPEC helps establish in the Mediterranean area has 
been considered the most important factor for an effective and successful response to marine 
pollution incidents.199 Initially, at the request of the Lebanese government, REMPEC provided 
technical advice on shoreline cleaning.200 Subsequently, REMPEC and the national authorities 
of Lebanon cooperated in the co-ordination of the response operations at the regional level.201 
UNEP-MAP also cooperates with various international organizations and non-governmental 
organizations, enabling capacity building and technical support for the implementation of the 
Barcelona Convention.202  
The obligations under the Convention are general in nature and aim at fostering 
cooperation between the states parties in order to combat pollution. For instance, parties are to 
“take all appropriate measures” in order to “prevent, abate, combat and to the fullest possible 
extent eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area”.203 It is noticeable that measures are 
to be “appropriate” and that pollution shall be eliminated “to the fullest possible extent”. These 
formulations serve to make the obligation less absolute and allow for leeway based on relevant 
circumstances. Considering that the law of armed conflict applies as lex specialis in this case, 
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this provision is not likely to lead to an interpretation which does not allow for an attack of a 
military target resulting in proportionate collateral environmental damage. Moreover, parties 
shall “apply the polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of pollution prevention, 
control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter, with due regard to the public 
interest”.204 However, the use of the terms “prevention, control and reduction measures” 
indicates that this provision primarily aims at precautionary work to reduce pollution.  
While Sand has suggested that the Barcelona Convention establishes accountability for 
pollution of the marine environment erga omnes partes, he does not specify what provision 
Israel would be in breach of or how such a provision relates to the law of armed conflict.205 In 
contrast to this statement, UNDP considers that the Barcelona Convention does not provide for 
compensation in individual cases, and that none of its protocols cover the situation of an oil 
spill from facilities on the shore due to a military operation.206 Supporting this conclusion, a 
report by the UN Secretary-General states that no conventions capable of entailing liability in 
this case are applicable in wartime.207  
Without doubt, the cooperation between parties and the organizational framework 
offered by UNEP-MAP and REMPEC was highly useful to quickly assess the damage and 
orchestrate the clean-up after the spill. These operations can be seen as remedies which serve 
to ensure that the damage done to the environment is mitigated to the fullest extent possible. 
However, in terms of state responsibility, there do not seem to be rules that provide specific 
enough obligations on which to base liability.  
2.6 Note on the UN General Assembly Resolutions 
In a series of eleven resolutions on the “Oil Slick on Lebanese Shores”, the UN General 
Assembly has expressed great concern about “the environmental disaster caused by the 
destruction by the Israeli Air Force on 15 July 2006 of the oil storage tanks in the direct vicinity 
of El-Jiyeh electric power plant in Lebanon”.208 It also called on the government of Israel to 
assume responsibility and pay damages, which have been estimated by the Secretary-General 
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in a 2014 report to amount to US $856.4 million.209 The resolutions also note that the Rio 
Declaration stipulates that “the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution”.210 
The resolutions of the UN General Assembly are not binding on the party they are 
directed towards, so not complying with a resolution cannot give rise to state liability. Although 
not legally binding, these resolutions do serve to express the opinion of the international 
community. The resolutions of the UN General Assembly can also be seen as state practice 
capable of giving rise to customary international law if paired with opinio juris. In this context 
however, the resolutions are most usefully viewed as a reflection of the opinion of the 
international community that remedies for environmental damage in war should reflect the 
polluter pays principle.  
 
2.7 Concluding the Case  
The above evaluation has shown that it is difficult even to assess whether or not environmental 
damage which has been carefully mapped and evaluated lives up to the threshold of widespread, 
long-term and severe damage, as set out in the customary rule prohibiting the use of means and 
methods of warfare leading to such damage. The case of the Jiyeh power station oil spill 
confirms previous conclusions that the requirements are both unclear and set the standard too 
high. Considering that a high level of environmental damage was foreseeable, it could be argued 
that Israel violated its obligation under customary international law to pay due regard to the 
environment. A high level of foreseeable damage means that a high level of regard should have 
been paid to the environment. However, whether or not such regard was paid is difficult to 
speculate on. Therefore, while in theory offering a different kind of protection than the 
prohibition of widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage, the obligation to pay 
due regard to the environment in military operations is also difficult to base state responsibility 
on in this case.  
There is a possibility that the actions taken by Israel constitute an internationally 
wrongful act under the general principles of distinction or proportionality. First, it is possible 
that tanks at the power station were not a legitimate military target. This is dependent on 
whether or not the fuel in the tanks was used mainly to sustain military operations. Second, the 
proportionality of the damage in relation to the military advantage gained can be questioned. 
However, the considerable room for interpretation makes it difficult to establish a clear breach 
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of the principle of proportionality. Even though these principles do not require the 
environmental damage caused to be widespread, long-term and severe, they attribute high 
weight to military objectives in relation to other protected values.  
These results are not out of the ordinary. There are few instances of international claims 
for state responsibility for environmental damage.211 In fact, the only known instance where 
such claims have been made for damage caused during armed conflict is after the 1990–91 Gulf 
War, when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused catastrophic environmental damage: some 3.5 
million tons of crude oil were spilled in the desert and 800,000 tons into the Persian Gulf.212 
Compensation through the law of state responsibility appears difficult to obtain in the case at 
hand, hence the situation itself is not reflective of the polluter pays principle. Since there is a 
slight chance that an internationally wrongful act is at hand, the compatibility of the remedy of 
compensation under the law of state responsibility with the polluter pays principle will 
nevertheless be examined in the concluding analysis in section 4.   
While the Barcelona Convention does not lend itself to base state liability on in this 
case, the institutional structure established by the treaty enabled a quick and well-coordinated 
response with cooperation from several state parties. The cooperation between parties to the 
treaty and the organizational framework offered by UNEP-MAP and REMPEC seems to have 
been highly useful in order to quickly assess the damage and organize clean-up operations. 
These operations function as remedies which serve to ensure that damage done to the 
environment is mitigated to the fullest extent possible.  
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3. The Niger Delta  
[I]nequities in the allocation of resources from oil and gas and the degradation of the Niger 
Delta environment by oil spills and gas flares continue to adversely affect human 
development conditions. The inequities fan increasingly intense and frequent conflicts.213 
3.1 Introducing the Case: “Gas flaring and oil spills are the key causes of 
damage to the environment in the Niger Delta”214 
Exploration for oil in the Niger Delta began as early as 1939, with commercial production 
taking off in 1958.215 According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
petroleum exports now make up US $41,818 million of Nigeria’s total export value of US 
$45,365 million,216 making Nigeria the largest oil producing country in Africa.217 The Niger 
Delta region comprises around 98 % of the transport channels for oil in the country.218 Given 
that production and sales of oil is a necessity for the economic continuation of the Nigerian 
state,219 it is easy to understand that keeping the presence of multinational oil corporations in 
the Delta is of great value to the government. However, negative effects arising from oil 
exploitation is one of the reasons that the region has seen a prolonged violent conflict.220 One 
scholar argues that environment-related conflicts in the region have their basis in the lack of 
implementation of environmental policies from government and multinational oil corporations, 
resulting in frustration among local population.221 Another traces conflict in the region to 
several different tensions: environmentalism in opposition of the harm caused by oil 
exploitation, distributional injustice, inequalities between culturally defined groups, as well as 
political marginalization.222  
Opposition against the presence and practices of multinational oil corporations has gone 
on for a long time. During the early 1990s, the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
worked through peaceful means such as petitions, demonstrations and litigations, with leader 
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Ken Saro-Wiwa at the forefront.223 According to Eke, repressive tactics from the government, 
culminating in Saro-Wiwa’s hanging in 1995, left no more space for peaceful opposition – 
“violent engagement became the only viable route”.224 Since then, different minority groups in 
the region have confronted the Federal Government and the multinational oil corporations, 
resulting in the militarization of the region.225 Over the years, there have been numerous armed 
groups fighting for independence, or for enhanced local benefit of the rich natural resources.226 
In late 2005 and early 2006 the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
started to use military force to attack oil installations and kidnap foreign oil workers.227 Among 
the strategies of the group are to cut revenues from oil production through oil theft and the 
sabotage of pipelines, both resulting in spills.228 MEND consists of a changing mass of groups, 
whose motivations differ from criminally seeking to enrich themselves to political and 
ideological, in attempting to bring attention to the environmental and economic hardships 
suffered by the people of the Delta due to oil exploitation.229 The Nigerian Federal Government 
has responded to the rise of armed groups by setting up the Joint Task Force, a special security 
force consisting of army, navy, air force and police units, that is charged with the mission of 
combatting the illicit activities of armed groups in the Delta.230 
The conflict in the Niger Delta has been characterized as “a complex blend of state-
driven political conflicts, ethnic violence, youth unrest, chieftancy (sic) tussle, political 
citizenship, and intra and inter-community tensions and criminality”.231 Oil companies have 
been said to exert considerable influence on the Federal Government,232 while local 
communities also believe them to have played part in sponsoring armed groups to intimidate 
local communities.233 In 1979, the Nigerian Federal Government established that oil deposits 
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are a national asset, effectively removing local ownership and control.234 As mentioned, the 
government has great interest in ensuring that oil companies continue to operate successfully. 
In fact, it has considered “threats to sustained exploration and production of the oil as a threat 
to national security”.235 At the same time, government officials and members of the Joint Task 
Force are accused of taking a share in the profits from oil theft committed by armed groups in 
exchange for not exerting justice.236  
In September 2009, shortly after an amnesty deal for militants was introduced by the 
Federal Government, the Council on Foreign Relations characterized the conflict as a “threat 
not only to the people of the region, but to the stability of Nigeria and the surrounding West 
Africa Region”.237 It concluded that the government had largely failed in its efforts to broker 
peace and that neither the large scale crack-down on military camps of May 2009 nor the 
subsequent amnesty, which offered former militants a monthly pay check in exchange for 
handing over their weapons, have overcome the tensions nor addressed the core problems 
causing the conflict.238 Recent industry reports confirm the prediction that the amnesty deal 
would not be capable of brokering long-term peace. In 2014, the biggest operator in the region, 
Shell Nigeria, reported 139 incidents of oil spills due to sabotage; in 2015, the number was 
93.239 Shell further reported that in 2015, 85 % of identified oil spills from its facilities were 
due to “crude oil theft, sabotage and illegal refining”,240 activities which are typically carried 
out by armed groups. Recently, groups have taken to off shore piracy while also pursuing their 
earlier strategies of conducting kidnappings for ransom and armed robberies.241 Shell concludes 
that security in the region is a major concern.242 It is clear that the amnesty program has not 
successfully eliminated the militancy in the region.  
Since early 2016 there are reports of a new group of militants, The Niger Delta 
Avengers, who demand an independent state and want the multinational oil companies to leave 
the region.243 They are thought to comprise, at least to some part, former rebels who have 
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returned to militancy from the amnesty program.244 While President Buhari has stated that he 
intends to “re-engineer” the amnesty program, he has also increased the presence of government 
troops in the Niger Delta region.245 Continued conflict and re-escalation of violence since 2009 
have also been reported by scholars. Eke claims that “the direct exchange of cash for peace in 
2009 and beyond propelled the new wave of violence in the Niger Delta”.246 Okonofua also 
concludes that violence in the region has steadily resurfaced, and points to a possible connection 
with the outcome of the 2015 elections.247 
Regarding the impact of the conflict on the environment, there is no study quite as 
comprehensive and conclusive as those on the Jiyeh power station.248 The difference in 
available material can be attributed to the difference in scope between the cases: the bombing 
of the Jiyeh power station is one isolated event, whereas the Niger Delta conflict consists of 
many events, spread over a long period of time and a large area. In part, the lack of 
comprehensive studies could also be a result of the fact that the conflict in the Delta is still 
ongoing, with periods of relative calm followed by increased violence. Notably, there is also a 
lack of extensive research into the issue of the effect of conflict on the environment in this case. 
Most research has focused on the inverse relationship: namely how the existence of rich natural 
resources in the area has played a part in sparking conflict.249 However, there is some research 
on the matter which concludes that the environmental impact of the conflict is serious. Ibaba 
concludes that “violent conflicts have undermined environmental quality through pollution and 
unsustainable exploitation of resources”.250  
Limiting this study in time and space is not as easily done as with the first case study of 
this thesis. While a report from the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
which will be addressed further in section 3.2.3 below, indicates that the time period from 2009 
until today is more interesting from a law of armed conflict perspective, it must be noted that 
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the environmental damage in the region has been accumulating over several more decades. 
Moreover, there is a lack of environmental impact assessments which comprehensively track 
the impact of oil spills in a manner that is geographically and temporally limited. With this in 
mind, the resurgence of violence after the 2009 amnesty will be the main temporal focus of the 
case study. The Ramsar Convention sites of Upper Orashi Forests and Apoi Creek Forests are 
located in Rivers state and Bayelsa state respectively. During 2013 and 2014, these states 
suffered from the largest amount of oil spilled in the region.251 To some extent, the study will 
therefore focus on these geographical areas. In order not to lose sight of the complexities of the 
conflict or the environmental impact on the region, more general facts will also be brought in.  
 
3.2 Non-International Armed Conflict  
3.2.1 Failure of Domestic Law  
The most evident difference between the conflict in the Niger Delta and the bombing of the 
Jiyeh power station is the fact that the Nigerian conflict is just that – Nigerian, internal, non-
international. Rather than two states, a complex set of actors is involved, with three sub-groups 
discernable: The Nigerian Federal Government, local armed groups and multinational oil 
corporations. At the outset of addressing this case, it is relevant to point out that domestic law 
has proved to be largely unsuccessful in regulating the environmental degradation connected to 
the conflict in the Niger Delta. Allen states that “oil-related legislations on the environment are 
hardly implemented or enforced in Nigeria”.252  
Moreover, access to procedural justice for the local population is lacking. This is 
evidenced by the fact that several claimants seeking to sue multinational oil corporations have 
turned to the domestic court system of the parent company.253 In addition, Ojakorotu and 
Okeke-Uzodike claim that rather than restoring the environment or compensating ordinary 
citizens, claims for compensation in Nigeria has turned into a business where community elite 
and local leaders devise methods to make personal gains from compensation offered by 
government, oil corporations, or international relief agencies.254 These circumstances present a 
challenge both in the sense that affected persons seeking justice in different jurisdictions might 
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not enjoy equal compensation, and in the sense that money is not always used to remediate 
environmental damage.  
 
3.2.2 Applicable Rules of International Law 
International environmental law has traditionally been concerned with transboundary issues and 
kept an indifferent view to what states do with their own environment.255 Further, the law of 
armed conflict is mostly concerned with conflicts between states. However, it is widely 
accepted that the law of armed conflicts applies, to some extent, to non-international conflict as 
well. Regarding treaty law, Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which regulate non-international armed conflict, do not contain any provisions 
directly protective of the environment.256 The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, which 
was amended in 2001 to also apply to non-international armed conflict, recalls the prohibition 
of wide-spread, long-term and severe environmental damage in its preamble.257 However, 
Nigeria is not a party to this Convention. In addition, the non-international nature of the conflict 
renders the provisions of Additional Protocol I inapplicable. Therefore, the assessment will 
have to be based on customary law.  
The ICRC Customary Law study considers it “less clear than for international armed 
conflicts” that the prohibition of means or methods of warfare causing intentional or foreseeable 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment should apply to conflicts 
of a non-international nature.258 It identifies that even if this rule has not yet crystallized into a 
rule of customary international law, present trends point towards such a development in the 
future.259 Sjöstedt considers that there is not enough evidence of state practice and opinio juris 
supporting an application of this rule to non-international armed conflict.260 Thus, this thesis 
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will not apply the prohibition of widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage to 
the conflict in the Niger Delta. Regarding the obligation to pay due regard to the environment, 
it could be argued to apply in cases where transboundary harm has occurred in non-international 
conflicts,261 but the present case concerns damage within one state. The application of 
customary international law to a non-international armed conflict to states and non-state actors 
has also been charted by the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. The Commission 
identified 24 rules of customary international law applicable to non-international armed 
conflict. Among those were the military principles of distinction, necessity and 
proportionality.262 This conclusion is also supported by scholarly writings and by the ICRC 
Customary Law Study.263 The duty to pay due regard to the environment and the prohibition 
on causing widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage were not included 
amongst the applicable rules.264 It should be noted, however, that the Commission only 
mentioned the rules it deemed relevant and applicable to the conflict in Darfur.265   
 
3.2.3 The Threshold Requirement of a Non-International Armed Conflict    
In Tadić, the ICTY concluded that while an international conflict encompasses just about any 
amount of violence between two states, a non-international armed conflict consists in 
“protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State”.266 For civil unrest to be classified as a non-international 
armed conflict, setting the rules of the law of armed conflict in motion, there are evidently two 
elements that need to be fulfilled. First, there is a need for sufficient organization within the 
armed groups. Second, there is a need for violence to reach a certain level of protraction.  
When considering the situation in the Niger Delta in 2013, the Office of the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court found that the armed groups in the area did fulfil the 
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conditions of sufficient organization, but that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that 
violence in the area had reached the required level of protraction.267 When conducting this 
assessment, the Office of the Prosecutor looked at two specific time periods: June to September 
2008 and January to July 2009, for the purposes of investigating crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.268 The conclusion that violence did not reach the required level of protraction was 
drawn because the available information was insufficient; the circumstances of the attacks 
investigated were not clear enough to assess the intensity of the violence.269 However, as 
already mentioned, since the amnesty issued to the militants by the government in 2009, 
violence has once again escalated in the region. An interview-study with 224 militants who had 
entered the peace deal reveals that 99 % of respondents admit that their organizations only 
handed over “a fraction of their arms” to the government.270 This is reflected in a report of the 
operations of groups affiliated with MEND between March 2011 and July 2013. During this 
time period, they had conducted 47 attacks, including blowing up pipelines, destroying oil 
wells, hijacking boats, killing police officers, Nigerian soldiers and sailors, as well as taking 
hostages.271 This indicates that at some point after the 2009 amnesty, the required level of 
protracted violence might have been reached.   
From an environmentalist perspective, there is reason to be critical of the investigation 
by the Office of the Prosecutor. The report does not mention the large scale environmental 
damage which is, at least to some extent, a direct effect of the conflict. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of 
the 1998 Rome Statute stipulates that intentional excessive environment harm constitutes a war 
crime.272 As such, the environment should be viewed as an objective worthy of protection and 
consideration when assessing whether or not violence is protracted. The attacks committed by 
armed groups on oil installations has been incessant for at least a decade and continues to cause 
environmental damage. When also considering that the nature of the conflict in the Niger Delta 
is characterized by the struggle for control over oil resources, it is notable that the report does 
not take environmental damage into consideration in its assessment of the conflict.  
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Sjöstedt argues that it is not always possible to tell when civil unrest passes the threshold 
of international armed conflict, and that it sometimes goes back and forth.273 While it is not 
possible to say with certainty that the situation in the Niger Delta between 2009 and today has 
reached the threshold level for a non-international armed conflict, there is a possibility that at 
some point, it has.  
Before moving on to apply the relevant norms of international law to the case, it is useful 
to shortly sum up this section. To the extent that the conflict in the Niger delta reaches the 
threshold of a non-international armed conflict, an application of the general principles of 
distinction, necessity and proportionality should be made. This will be done in section 3.3.1 
below. In addition, there are MEAs, which apply both in peacetime and in wartime, to the extent 
that they do not contradict the lex specialis of the law of armed conflict. These will be discussed 
further in section 3.4.  
 
3.3 Responsibility of Non-State Actors 
It is not useful to assess whether the counter operations of the Nigerian Federal Government 
through its Joint Task Force is causing environmental damage in this conflict, as there is little 
evidence pointing in that direction. However, under article 8 of the ILCDA, the actions of a 
non-state actor can be attributed to the state if it has exercised sufficient control over the actions 
of the group. Although state level government and members of the military have been accused 
of condoning oil theft and sabotage by armed groups in exchange for political support or 
money,274 this cannot be considered to reach the high threshold of effective control required for 
the government to be held responsible.275  
Apart from the state, there are two groups of actors whose responsibility are of interest 
to examine in the context of the Niger Delta conflict: the armed groups and the multinational 
oil corporations. Considering that the applicable law of armed conflict has been narrowed down 
to the general principles of distinction, necessity and proportionality, these will be considered 
in the following sub-section in relation to the armed groups. The oil companies are private 
entities, which are not bound by the rules of the law of armed conflict. In section 3.3.2 below, 
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the responsibility of private entities under international law is considered, and a short digression 
into international private law is made.  
  
3.3.1 Responsibility of Armed Groups: Applying Customary International Law 
An estimate made in 2007 put the number of armed groups in the region at 48, possibly 
including as many as 60,000 rebels with an arsenal of 10,000 weapons.276 Although internal 
alliances of the groups are constantly shifting,277 their methods of warfare and their goals 
coincide with one another. As already mentioned, methods include stealing oil, sabotaging 
pipelines and conducting kidnappings. Goals include obtaining regional self-determination and 
control over natural resources, as well as achieving financial gain.278 Increased environmental 
protection against the exploitation of the oil companies is another common stated goal of these 
organizations.279  
The armed groups could be held responsible under article 10 of the ILCDA. The article 
states both that the actions of “an insurrectional movement which becomes the new government 
shall be considered an act of that State” and that if such a movement “succeeds in establishing 
a new state”, it can be held accountable. As mentioned, it has been reported that the Niger Delta 
Avengers aim to establish an independent state. However, it does not seem very likely that 
either of these two scenarios will play out in the Niger Delta. The constantly shifting nature of 
alliances within and between the armed groups speak against organization on a level where they 
are capable of taking over government or establishing their own state.  
Even if the groups are not successful in establishing an autonomous state in the Niger 
Delta, the general principles of the law of armed conflict are binding on combatting non-state 
actors once they have reached a sufficient level of organization.280 The report by the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court found that the groups operating under the 
MEND-umbrella reached the level of organization before the amnesty program was 
introduced.281 The fact that the armed groups have entered into an amnesty deal with the 
government stipulating ceasefire, albeit of limited success, further strengthens the conclusion 
that they reach the sufficient level of organization.  
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The type of military operations which are conducted by the armed groups are arguably 
less traditional than the operations which the general principles have evolved in relation to. 
When considering the principle of distinction, it is notable that the very aim of conducting 
sabotage can be to attack non-military targets. In this case, the oil installations which are 
attacked are undoubtedly of civilian nature. To a small extent, the revenues from oil could serve 
to support the government forces which strive to suppress the armed groups, but this cannot be 
considered enough to turn them into legitimate military targets.282 The conclusion that they do 
not constitute legitimate military targets in a conflict between armed groups and government 
forces is further supported by the aims of the attacks, which are more geared towards stealing 
oil or disturbing the operations of oil corporations than towards decreasing the capabilities of 
the national military.  
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the attacks on oil installations resulting in oil spills are 
proportionate in relation to the military advantages gained. The environmental damage in the 
region due to oil spills include large scale water poisoning and destruction of vegetation and 
agriculture lands.283 The nutrient values of farmlands have been negatively affected, resulting 
in poor crop yields, and marine life has been destroyed, resulting in a decrease in fishing 
revenues.284 In fact, the Niger Delta has been described as “one of the world’s most severely 
impacted ecosystem by petroleum”.285 Already in 2006, approximately nine to thirteen million 
barrels of oil had been spilled into the wetlands, which is equivalent to 50 times the volume 
caused by the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, an often cited example of large-scale destruction due 
to an oil spill.286 It has to be noted that not all damage is a direct result of sabotage or accidental 
spills occurring during oil theft by armed groups, but these operations are most certainly 
contributing to the degradation.287 In comparison, the military advantage gained by the armed 
groups seems slim. They succeed in part in decreasing the revenues of both oil corporations 
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and the federal government,288 and in one area, violent protests have resulted in the oil 
corporations ceasing their operations.289 However, the argument has been made that nowadays, 
these attacks are in reality performed solely for the rebels to enrich themselves, while using 
environmental concerns, striving for independence, or local control of natural resources as veils 
behind which to hide in order to lend greater legitimacy to the operations.290 As a UNDP report 
from 2006 puts it: “Conflict has become a booming business”.291 
A breach of the general principles of distinction or proportionality could incur liability 
on part of the armed groups, applying “state” liability by analogy. If this solution were to be 
sought, however, the Nigerian Federal Government would have to recognize the groups as an 
actor possessing international personality and identify the situation as one of non-international 
armed conflict. In cases of civil unrest, the established regime will often want to avoid 
according insurgency groups any kind of legitimacy. Recognizing the armed groups fighting in 
the Niger Delta as possessing international personality in the form of a warring party in a non-
international armed conflict is most likely far from an option for the Nigerian government. On 
the contrary, the groups have been portrayed as criminals, without a legitimate cause to fight 
the regime.292  
 
3.3.2 Responsibility of Multinational Oil Corporations  
Apart from the government and the armed groups, there is one additional group of actors 
operating in the Niger Delta which is of interest: the multinational oil corporations. Companies 
play a limited role on the arena of public international law. While the OECD has adopted 
guidelines for multinational enterprises regarding their conduct in relation to environmental 
protection, these are not legally binding.293 Their success is therefore dependent on the domestic 
legislation implementing them. Ong has concluded that in countries where domestic legal 
measures leave more to wish “there is [also] a lack of international mechanisms that are directly 
enforceable against these private transnational economic actors to hold them accountable for 
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their environmental damage”.294 The lack of accountability is pertinent in times of armed 
conflict, perhaps especially so during civil war or unrest, since companies exploring for natural 
resources have an opportunity to use the collapse of domestic institutions to their benefit, and 
are able to profit by operating in conflict zones.295 It could be argued that at least some of the 
responsibility should rest on the companies choosing to continue their operations in a region 
where spills caused by sabotage are well-known to result in environmental damage. 
Setting aside the limited attention paid to private entities in the sphere of public 
international law, their role in the concrete case of environmental damage in the Niger Delta 
conflict cannot be overlooked. The role of multinational oil corporations in the conflict is 
arguably very complex, and an exhaustive attempt to understand the dynamics of the conflict 
or the relationship between the companies and the other actors is not made here. The 
responsibility of oil companies for spills caused by the conflict is also diffuse. According to 
Nigerian law, they are not obliged to pay damages for spills caused by sabotage.296 They are, 
however, required to perform clean-up measures regardless of the origin of a spill.297 The 
Nigerian state is dependent on the continued operation of the oil companies, and domestic 
environmental legislation and control has been argued to be almost non-existent, resulting in 
poor implementation of this obligation.298 Complicating the matter further are the allegations 
that oil companies are hiding behind sabotage spills and oil theft to avoid as much responsibility 
as possible.299 A Chatham House report recently observed that “[i]n June 2013, an NCP panel 
in the Netherlands issued a statement criticizing Shell for publishing data that exaggerated oil 
theft’s role as a cause of oil spills in the Niger Delta”.300  
From a perspective of international private law, if the reader will allow a small 
digression from the scope of the thesis, the transboundary aspect found in the corporate 
structure of the multinational oil corporations operating in the region is interesting. Institutional 
structures which separate the company acting in Nigeria from the national jurisdiction in which 
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the parent company operates provide an advantageous setting for oil companies not to prevent, 
restore or compensate for harm resulting from the conflict.301  Further, there is a history of the 
biggest operator in the region, the Nigerian branch of Shell, not complying with the rulings of 
Nigerian court decisions in claims for compensation regarding environmental degradation.302  
Attempts by Niger Deltans to sue in foreign jurisdiction have been made on at least three 
occasions recently.303 There are two interconnected hurdles to clear in such cases. First, the 
corporate structure establishing a subsidiary based in the local jurisdiction. Second, a claim can 
be rejected based on the principle of forum non conveniens: a case should be brought before the 
court best suited to try it. In this case, it could be argued that a claim against a Nigerian 
subsidiary, operating in Nigeria, which is brought by Nigerian claimants should be settled in a 
Nigerian domestic court. This rule can, and Ebbesson argues in some cases should, be set aside 
when there is a lack of access to justice in the state where the harm took place.304 Either by 
setting aside the presumption of forum non conveniens and holding the Nigerian subsidiary 
responsible in foreign jurisdiction, or by looking through the corporate veil and establishing de 
facto control over the subsidiary by the parent company and holding it responsible in its 
domestic jurisdiction. Lack of access to justice was a problem for the claimants from the Niger 
Delta “due to several possible reasons, including an inability to fund lawyers and experts to 
represent them in their local courts, as well as the persecution of claimants, and corruption”.305 
A new development is discernible in the Akpan and Bodo cases, where courts have set aside the 
presumption of forum non conveniens and concluded that “it is the failure to protect/prevent the 
relevant oil wellhead/pipeline from acts of sabotage that cause oil spill damage that can give 
rise to liability on the part of the operating oil company”.306  
However, the option to bring a case against an oil company before the courts of the 
jurisdiction of the parent company, is in all likelihood a far-fetched option for the vast majority 
of locals who have suffered losses due to the environmental damage from oil spills. In 
conclusion, there are few measures available to hold multinational oil corporations accountable.  
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3.4 Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
 
3.4.1 Applying Multilateral Environmental Agreements in a Non-International Armed Conflict 
A general discussion on the application of MEAs in armed conflict is available above in section 
2.5.1. In a non-international armed conflict, given that the law of armed conflict applies as lex 
specialis, consideration must be had to the state party needing to resort to military means to 
defeat the armed groups that it is fighting. Likewise, if a non-state actor is recognized as 
possessing international personality, it operates under the law of armed conflict and is awarded 
the same leeway for its military purposes as the government. Nigeria is a signatory to two 
relevant MEAs which contain provisions that are presumed to continue to apply during 
wartime: The Ramsar Convention and the Abidjan Convention.  
 
3.4.2 The Ramsar Convention  
The Ramsar Convention aims to protect wetlands and waterfowl of international significance. 
The protection of wetland habitats is important because of their “fundamental ecological 
functions (…) as regulators of water regimes and as habitats supporting a characteristic flora 
and fauna, especially waterfowl”,307 making them especially interesting when considering the 
oil pollution in the Niger Delta. Under the Convention, wetlands are defined as “areas of marsh, 
fen, peatland, or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is 
static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at 
low tide does not exceed six metres”.308 
The Ramsar Convention is especially promising when it comes to ensuring protection 
to the environment during armed conflict, for several reasons. In part, it is promising because 
it is centered around the designation of protected zones. Sjöstedt identifies three reasons for 
why treaties which designate areas as protected zones are particularly useful in the context of 
armed conflict. First of all, the designation of a protected zone can be used as a tool to “identify 
and preserve biological ‘hot-spots’ of international significance”.309 The areas protected under 
the Ramsar Convention are chosen specifically for their fundamental ecological function. By 
ensuring that such areas are specifically protected, the Ramsar Convention contributes to 
“preserve endangered species and rare ecosystems, and prevents the loss of biodiversity on a 
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global scale”.310 Second, the protected areas under the Convention constitute defined 
geographical zones, which make their protection more tangible than a more abstract 
environmental component.311 Moreover, the law of armed conflict already offers a similar 
protection measure in the form of demilitarized zones as well as hospital and safety zones.312 It 
will be easier to avoid environmental damage to a designated environmentally protected zone, 
since this practice is already applied to other types of protected zones. It will also be easier to 
detect and pinpoint damage done to areas that are protected. Changes in the ecological area 
which is under the protection of the Ramsar Convention should also be tracked by the ratifying 
country.313 Consequently, any environmental degradation due to an armed conflict in such an 
area will be easier to point to once it has occurred. Designating environmental zones as 
protected is also a suggestion in the ongoing work of the International Law Commission on the 
topic.314 Third, areas that have been designated special protection under the Ramsar Convention 
are vulnerable, that is part of the reason for why they are designated such protection. In times 
of conflict, this vulnerability is intensified.315  
In Nigeria, there are 11 sites protected under the Ramsar Convention, which entered 
into force in the state on 2 February 2001. Two of these sites are located in the Niger Delta:  the 
Upper Orashi Forests (Rivers state) and the Apoi Creek Forests (Bayelsa state). On the website 
of the Convention, it is noted that “[o]pportunities for tourism, education and research are 
currently hampered by ethnic militancy, insecurity, poaching and uncontrolled logging” in the 
Upper Orashi Forests.316 Further, the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment confirms that 
the Ramsar sites in the Niger Delta have been negatively affected by the oil spills resulting from 
the ongoing conflict.317 In fact, the most pressing threats to the sites are stated to be oil spills 
and militancy.318 However, due to a lack of funding, there is no management plan in place for 
either of the sites,319 which could have served to lay out strategies for mitigating these threats.   
The Ramsar Convention treaty body (Conference of the Parties) has the power to make 
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recommendations that the parties must take into consideration.320 This opens up for the treaty 
body to make recommendations to Nigeria on how best to protect its wetland environments 
during conflict. However, it might be difficult for the treaty body to pinpoint the exact needs 
for conservation efforts in the Niger Delta, since the impact of armed conflict on wetlands is 
currently not identified as a threat within the treaty system. In the national reports filled out by 
governments, Nigeria makes no mention of the conflict in the Niger Delta region as a potential 
threat to the wetlands.321 This is most likely because the questionnaire does not ask about it, 
since the Nigerian national focal point of the Convention has confirmed that militancy and oil 
spills constitute the most pressing threats to both sites.322 By not specifically recognizing armed 
conflict as a threat to wetland environments, the treaty body has less specific information on 
which to base its decision on whether or not to make a recommendation, and what such a 
recommendation should consist in.   
The application of an environmental treaty is made more difficult in a state where 
institutional systems are affected by both armed conflict and corruption.323 Sjöstedt points out 
that armed conflict often brings with it “inadequate infrastructure and non-functional state 
organs” obstructing even a minimum level of environmental protection.324 This is where a treaty 
such as the Ramsar Convention becomes particularly useful. The treaty structure could help 
reinforce the weak institutions, as well as involve other actors in the conservation work. State 
involvement can be limited, while relying more heavily on “other treaty bodies, UN agencies, 
non-governmental organisations, or private enterprises”.325 The Ramsar Convention could offer 
remediating measures by acting as a platform for projects to improve the environmental quality, 
provide funding, and organize education for the purposes of improving conservation methods 
for wetlands that have been negatively affected by oil spills connected to the conflict in the 
Niger Delta. Such supportive measures could be carried out during an armed conflict as well as 
after the cessation of hostilities.326 
Today, only around 550 km2 is protected by the Convention, which represents less than 
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1 % of the total Niger Delta area of 70,000 km2, and implementation seems to be progressing 
somewhat slowly.327 Regarding a possible expansion of areas protected by the Ramsar 
Convention, the Department of Forestry states that all of Ogoniland, a region located in Rivers 
state, is considered for designation as a site.328 This is line with a UNEP report, which concludes 
that oil spills have had a detrimental effect on the environment in the Ogoniland region.329 
Moreover, neither one of the wetlands in the Delta region is inscribed on the Montreux Record 
over wetlands where “changes in ecological character have occurred, are occurring or are likely 
to occur”.330 As a consequence, the Ramsar Advisory Mission, capable of assisting parties with 
management and conservation of wetlands where the ecological character is threatened, is 
currently not concerned with either of the Niger Delta sites.331 While the Conference of the 
Parties has the potential to step in and make recommendations more useful to further the 
conservation of Upper Orashi Forests and Apoi Creek Forests, to date, it has not. However, it 
should also be considered that there are few sanctions for a state party which does not accept 
the recommendations of an MEA treaty body.332  
The breach of a multilateral treaty could generate consequences under the law of 
treaties. Under the Ramsar Convention, Nigeria is obligated to implement a plan for the 
conservation of designated wetlands, as well as staying informed of any actual or likely changes 
in ecological character and passing such information on to the Convention secretariat.333 It is 
possible to question whether Nigeria is currently fulfilling these obligations. The latest report 
made to the Ramsar secretariat shows that a national wetlands policy or equivalent instrument 
is not yet being implemented and the ecological status of the Ramsar sites has not been updated 
since 2008.334 Under article 60(3)(b) of the VCLT, a breach of a provision which is essential to 
the accomplishment of the object or purpose of a treaty constitutes a material breach, giving 
rise to possibilities for other parties to suspend or terminate the treaty under article 60(2) of the 
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VCLT. However, considering that the aim of the Ramsar Convention is to further the protection 
of wetlands, such actions do not seem productive. Cutting off a state that is struggling with 
conservation efforts, due to both internal conflict and a lack of funding, from the Ramsar treaty 
system does not promote the furtherance of environmental protection. In line with this 
consideration, the Convention is characterized by a spirit of cooperation; trust is placed in each 
party striving to eventually reach the goals.335 Measures under the law of treaties therefore do 
not appear to provide any remedies for environmental damage.   
The breach of an obligation under an MEA could also lead to state responsibility. For 
this to be an available remedy, damage most often needs to be of a transboundary nature. 
Compensation can be sought by an injured state,336 and for obvious reasons, the injured state 
cannot be the same as the state at fault. However, the situation where an obligation is owed to 
a group of states and aims to protect a collective interest of this group, constitutes an important 
exception, 337 sometimes referred to as obligations erga omnes partes. Goodwin has argued that 
an obligation under the World Heritage Convention applies erga omnes partes based on the 
emphasis that the preamble puts on the international importance of protecting world heritage 
sites.338 A similar line of reasoning could be applied to the Ramsar Convention. The preamble 
of the Convention considers “the fundamental ecological functions of wetlands” the loss of 
which “would be irreplaceable” and considers that waterfowl constitute “an international 
resource”.339 Using this line of reasoning, any of the other parties could invoke state 
responsibility against Nigeria for breaching its obligations under the Convention. However, it 
is doubtful whether this is a useful way forward in terms of providing remedies for 
environmental damage. As Goodwin argues, even if it is possible for another state party to 
invoke state responsibility, reparations for loss of cultural heritage in such a case are “highly 
likely to amount simply to an acknowledgement of the breach coupled with an apology and 
assurances as to future conduct”.340 Here, an analogy can be made between cultural heritage 
and ecological values. In any case, seeking to establish state responsibility does not seem 
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fruitful in the case at hand, especially since the reason for slow implementation of the Ramsar 
Convention in Nigeria has been said to result at least in part from a lack of funding.341 
 
3.4.3 The Abidjan Convention  
Nigeria is also a party to the Abidjan Convention, a treaty aiming inter alia to stem oil pollution 
of the seas in the West and Central African region. The treaty covers “the marine environment, 
coastal zones and related inland waters” of the contracting parties, making it applicable to the 
inland waters of the Niger Delta as well as the coastal areas where the river Niger has its outlets.  
Like the Ramsar Convention, the Abidjan Convention contains few specific obligations. 
The Convention does, however, contain a provision which obligates the parties to “take all 
appropriate measures (…) to prevent, reduce, combat and control pollution of the Convention 
area and to ensure sound environmental management of natural resources (…) in accordance 
with their capabilities”.342 With consideration to the implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws in Nigeria, it can be questioned whether this obligation is currently met:  
 
The enforcement of environmental laws, especially those that deal with wetland areas, 
remains poor since most of the violators are hardly caught, prosecuted or punished. Despite 
massive and continuous degradation of wetlands, by individuals and corporate entities, 
there is hardly any record of anybody serving punishment for violating environmental 
standards in wetlands in Nigeria.343  
 
The measures available under the law of treaties, considered above, show that suspension or 
termination of the treaty will not provide useful remedies. As with the Ramsar Convention, it 
is of interest to consider whether this obligation is applicable erga omnes partes. While the 
preamble of the Convention recognizes the “economic, social and health value of the marine 
environment” and the responsibility of the parties to “preserve their natural heritage”,344 it does 
not refer to these values as a collective interest of the contracting parties. However, Cardesa-
Salzman argues that global environmental goods protected in an MEA, such as the marine and 
coastal environment of a geographical region, are implicitly regarded to be of common concern 
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to the parties.345 As such, it is arguable that the obligation under article 4 of the Abidjan 
Convention could be used as a basis for invoking state responsibility, erga omnes partes. The 
obligation is flexible, as it allows parties to identify the appropriate measures and obligates 
them only as far as their capabilities permit. As such, this obligation allows for an application 
which does not counter to the law of armed conflict, which should be applied as lex specialis 
during time periods when the unrest in the Niger Delta reaches the threshold requirement of a 
non-international armed conflict. However, as previously identified, this flexibility is also what 
might render it difficult to establish a breach which gives rise to state responsibility.  
Considering the remedies available within the framework of the Convention, the 
meeting of the contracting parties has the ability to make recommendations, but unlike the 
Ramsar Convention, there is no mention that these recommendations must be taken into account 
by the parties.346 The meeting of the contracting parties also has the competence to establish 
working groups related to any matters concerning the Convention and to establish co-operative 
activities to be undertaken within the framework of the Convention.347 Hence, there is potential 
for establishing a working group or another form of co-operative activity within the framework 
of the Convention to support the Nigerian state in dealing with the pollution in the Niger Delta.  
A meeting of the contracting parties was held in March 2017. At the conference, the 
parties approved the drafting of an additional protocol on sustainable mangrove management 
and encouraged a meeting for its adoption to take place as soon as possible.348 The draft protocol 
aims to establish modalities for environmental protection of mangrove ecosystems and includes 
identification and mapping of degraded sites as well as development of techniques and 
cooperation for their restoration and rehabilitation.349 The implementation of this protocol, if 
adopted by Nigeria, could improve the environmental protection of the wetland areas in the 
Niger Delta, where mangrove ecosystems are currently heavily impacted by oil pollution.350  
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3.5 Concluding the Case  
Several scholars who have delved into the environmental issues of the Niger Delta point to the 
natural resource-curse in the area: while it is hugely rich and provides the nation as well as 
multinational oil corporations with plentiful wealth, the local communities are becoming poorer 
and the environment is steadily becoming more degraded.351 To this can be added that it is 
evident that the polluter(s) is not paying in a way that reflects environmental justice.  
The actors most readily identified as the polluter in this situation are the armed groups 
conducting operations of sabotage and oil theft. The government cannot be said to exert enough 
control over these groups for responsibility under article 8 of the ILCDA to be actualized. 
Nevertheless, in times where the level of violence exceeds the threshold requirement for a non-
international armed conflict, it is likely that their actions constitute breaches of both the 
principle of military distinction and that of proportionality. However, the constantly shifting 
nature of alliances within and between the groups speak against organization on a level where 
they are capable of taking over government or establishing their own state. Responsibility under 
article 10 of the ILCDA is therefore not likely to become applicable. Moreover, the unlikeliness 
that the Nigerian Federal Government will recognize these groups as possessing international 
personality makes exerting responsibility based on these rules an improbable path forward.  
Apart from individual criminal responsibility, there are no legally binding norms of 
international law under which the multinational oil corporations could be held accountable. 
Theories on how to exert the equivalent of “state” responsibility from multinational companies 
therefore remain hypothetical and do not present viable alternatives for remedies. For local 
people affected by the environmental degradation, the possibility of suing an oil company in 
the domestic courts of their parent company means engaging in a long and difficult process. 
Despite recent success, there is no guarantee of displacing the principle against accepting claims 
relating to a foreign jurisdiction.352 Thus, there are few measures available to hold multinational 
oil corporations accountable. 
Holding the Nigerian state responsible for failing to correctly implement its obligations 
under the Ramsar Convention or the Abidjan Convention on its own territory could be possible 
for other parties to these treaties since both Conventions contain obligations which arguably 
apply erga omnes partes. However, it is questionable both whether such an alternative is a 
fruitful remedy in terms of offering actual environmental remedies and whether a breach of the 
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obligations, which are vaguely phrased, can be established. In this case, resorting to measures 
of suspending or terminating an MEA under the law of treaties does not offer any useful 
remedies. For a state struggling with conservation efforts due to both internal conflict and a 
lack of funding to be cut off from the system does not promote the furtherance of environmental 
restoration.  
Restoration, through local environmental and development projects, could be a better 
way forward for the environment itself as well as benefit a broader spectrum of local population. 
Working through the frameworks of the Ramsar Convention and the Abidjan Convention offers 
important opportunities which are currently not being utilized to the fullest. While the 
Conference of the Parties under the Ramsar Convention has the potential to step in and make 
recommendations more useful to further the conservation of Upper Orashi Forests and Apoi 
Creek Forests, to date, it has not. It is notable that by not specifically recognizing armed conflict 
as a threat to wetland environments, the treaty body has less specific information on which to 
base its decision on whether or not to make a recommendation, and what such a 
recommendation should consist in. There is also a need for allocating more sites in the Niger 
Delta as protected zones under the Ramsar Convention. Better monitoring and data-collection 
of the status of the sites would also have to be carried out in order to determine what measures 
are most suitable to enhance their protection. If such measures are successfully put in place, 
they have the potential of mitigating the damage done to the Niger Delta through oil spills 
occurring in the ongoing conflict.  
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4. In Conclusion 
4.1 Concluding Analysis  
This section will use the findings of the case studies to evaluate the compatibility of available 
remedies with the polluter pays principle, understood to incorporate considerations of 
corrective, distributive and procedural justice. The analysis will be done in four steps. First, I 
will consider whether compensation under the law of state responsibility based on a breach of 
the law of armed conflict is achievable in the cases. Second, whether it is achievable based on 
a breach of the applicable MEAs. Third, an evaluation of how well the remedy of compensation 
under the law of state responsibility reflects the polluter pays principle will be done. Lastly, the 
extent to which alternative remedies provided by the MEAs reflect the polluter pays principle 
will be evaluated.  
  
4.1.1 Basing State Responsibility on the Law of Armed Conflict  
Even in the “most likely” case – the bombing of the tanks at Jiyeh power station – the 
availability of remedies under the law of state responsibility does not reflect the polluter pays 
principle to any significant extent. Notably, the examined rules for environmental protection 
available under the law of armed conflict are vague, and tend to set high demands for 
establishing a breach. As long as this is true of the material rules, although theoretically 
possible, the law of state responsibility will seldom be resorted to. 
In a non-international armed conflict, such as the unrest in the Niger Delta, few rules 
protecting the environment in armed conflict are applicable. The general principles of the law 
of armed conflict apply to armed groups waging war in a non-international armed conflict, but 
the regime they are opposing is often reluctant to see such groups as legitimate actors of 
international law, thus rendering compensation under the law of state responsibility an unlikely 
remedy to achieve. Out of the rules of the law of armed conflict examined in the case studies 
above, the general principles of distinction, proportionality and necessity were the most useful 
in the context of protecting the environment in armed conflict. This is because they apply in 
situations of non-ratification of Additional Protocol I as well as in non-international armed 
conflict. Perhaps more importantly, they do not set the both high and vague threshold that 
environmental damage has to be widespread, long-term and severe in order to be prohibited.353  
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4.1.2 Basing State Responsibility on Applicable MEAs 
As was seen in the case study on the Niger Delta, holding a state responsible for failing to 
implement obligations under an MEA resulting in damage on the state’s own territory is 
possible if the obligations apply erga omnes partes. Other parties to both the Barcelona 
Convention and the Abidjan Convention could resort to remedies under state responsibility 
since both Conventions contain obligations that arguably apply erga omnes partes. However, 
it is questionable both whether such an alternative is a fruitful remedy in terms of offering actual 
environmental protection and whether a breach of the obligations, which are vaguely phrased, 
can be actually be established. The difficulty in basing state responsibility on MEAs is primarily 
due to their general nature and lack of concrete obligations.  
The case study on the Jiyeh power station shows that a breach of a provision, resulting 
in harm to another state party, could in theory lead to state responsibility. However, the law of 
armed conflict applies as lex specialis. This means that where an obligation under a treaty 
provision obligates the parties to mitigate pollution, the law of armed conflict allows for 
proportionate collateral environmental damage in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Not 
mitigating pollution caused by a military operation beyond the level required by the law of 
armed conflict can in such a case hardly be considered a breach of the treaty provision.  
Both the Barcelona Convention and the Abidjan Convention make references to the 
polluter pays principle, but their application in these cases do not give rise to remedies that 
reflect the principle in a satisfactory way. However, it should be recognized that the framework 
of the treaties is aimed at fostering long-term cooperation between the parties, rather than 
setting out rules based on which the parties can claim liability from one another.  
 
4.1.3 Does the Remedy of Compensation Under the Law of State Responsibility Reflect the 
Polluter Pays Principle?  
Through the remedy of compensation under the law of state responsibility, there is a potential 
of exerting corrective justice; the faulting state can be made to compensate the injured state. In 
the sense of corrective justice, the use of compensation as a remedy under the state 
responsibility regime reflects the polluter pays principle. However, in terms of distributive and 
procedural justice, the law of state responsibility can be problematic.  
Seen from the perspective of distributive justice, the polluter pays principle ought to 
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ensure, to the highest extent possible, that an equally high quality of environment is enjoyed 
between states, as well as within the state that has been injured. At the very least, it should not 
promote further injustice. However, compensation poses some fundamental difficulties when 
considering the distributive justice perspective, both on an international and a domestic level. 
On an international level, it can be considered unfair to be able to pay one’s way out of having 
caused environmental damage in another state. There is a risk of this coming to mean that once 
compensation is awarded, damage that goes un-remediated or is irreparable will be considered 
acceptable. For instance, UNDP considers that the severe effect of sunken oil caused on the 
benthic ecosystem close to Jiyeh Power Station “may well be irreversible in nature”.354 On a 
domestic level, the risk of corruption in the state receiving the compensation has to be 
considered. A high level of corruption could mean there is a risk that compensation does not 
reach the activities seeking to remediate environmental damage. Transparency International 
considers the corruption in Lebanon to be high.355 Even in a state where corruption is lower, 
the local population in damaged areas who have less resources and rely on fishing, farming or 
tourism for their livelihood run the risk of not benefitting from the payments to an extent where 
their damage is fully mitigated. Since more than a decade has passed since the damage occurred 
in the case of the Jiyeh power station, restoration measures have already been taken. It is the 
costs of these efforts that can be covered by compensation from the injuring state. A fair 
application of state responsibility, would therefore rely on the Lebanese government 
distributing the compensation between actors who have sustained costs in carrying out clean-
up measures, local population who have suffered losses from environmental damage, and 
measures aiming to restore the environment to the extent that it has not already been restored.  
Further, the remedy of compensation presents a clear lack in procedural justice in two 
ways. First, since the process is state-centered, there is a lack of access to justice for individuals 
or communities whom have suffered environmental damage. They have to rely on their 
government to take measures to ensure that remedies reach affected areas and individuals. 
Moreover, a state-centered process might lead to the environment being viewed simply as 
property, which the state can chose to restore or not to restore. Second, it is excessively difficult 
to prove a breach of material rules that are so vague, resulting in a lack of justice for a state 
seeking to claim damages. Vagueness of obligations of environmental protection is 
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characteristic both for the law of armed conflict provisions and for the MEAs investigated in 
this thesis. However, while all states are sovereign and equal in theory, procedural justice 
between states cannot be considered a reality in other instances either. The example of the UN 
Security Council condemnation of Iraq’s illegal invasion of Kuwait in the 1990–91 Gulf War 
can be seen as an indicator that environmental damage committed by a state without close allies 
within the five permanent members of the Council will more readily be the subject of liability 
than other such damage.356  
 
4.1.4 Do Alternative Remedies Provided by Applicable MEAs Reflect the Polluter Pays 
Principle?   
The measures which were provided through the Barcelona Convention after the Jiyeh power 
plant oil spill are useful from the point of view of ensuring actual remediation of the 
environment. In practice, this works to provide an equal distribution of a clean environment – 
or at least to prevent enhanced inequality. In fact, the most effective way of achieving 
distributive justice might not be for responsibility to take the form of monetary compensation 
to the state or to individuals. Restoration, through local environmental and development 
projects, could be a better way forward for the environment itself as well as benefit a broader 
spectrum of local population. This can work to ensure a greater degree of distributive justice, 
since restoration will actually take place, something monetary compensation through state 
liability does not guarantee. Such an approach works to ensure that the unfair distribution of a 
clean environment is not enhanced. When considering the situation in the Niger Delta, working 
through the framework of the Ramsar Convention and the Abidjan Convention offer important 
opportunities which are currently not being utilized to the fullest.  
A drawback which these remedies present is the lack of corrective justice exerted. In 
the case of Lebanon corrective justice is manifestly lacking since the costs of the clean-up are 
not born by Israel, but rather by the government, assisting states, and international 
organizations. In the case of the Niger Delta, neither the armed groups, the oil companies nor 
the government is made to pay for the pollution if relying on external organizations through the 
Ramsar Convention or the Abidjan Convention to ensure environmental protection during 
armed conflict. In order to achieve a higher degree of compatibility with the polluter pays 
principle, programs could be envisaged where former militants are educated to work with 
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environmental restoration. This could be beneficial in preventing future damage as well, 
considering that unemployment has been identified as one of the reasons for why rebels take to 
arm.357 A role for multinational oil corporations in such a solution could also be envisaged. 
Here, payment of the polluter could be achieved through their sponsoring of programs under 
the Ramsar Convention or Abidjan Convention. This is especially relevant given that the 
Department of Forestry states that the reason for not having management plans in place for the 
current Ramsar sites is a lack of funding. 
It has been suggested that MEAs can serve to fill some of the normative gap presented 
by protection under the law of armed conflict. On their own, however, they do not present 
remedies that fully reflect the polluter pays principle. Below, an alternative approach which 
combines protection under MEAs that designate protected zones and compensation under the 
law of state responsibility, will be considered.  
 
4.2 Going Forward  
The following section will provide two suggestions for enhancing the compatibility of remedies 
for environmental damage caused in armed conflict with the polluter pays principle: combining 
protection under MEAs with state responsibility and building on the approach of the UN 
Compensation Commission. This section will also provide suggestions for further research on 
the topic.  
 
4.2.1 Combining Protection under MEAs with State Responsibility   
While neither system of remedies is capable of fully reflecting the polluter pays principle on its 
own, it is possible that a combination of remedies under MEAs and state responsibility can be 
fruitful. The use of state responsibility primarily has the potential to ensure corrective justice 
between states. Remedial measures available coordinated within the framework of an MEA can 
step in to ensure greater distributive environmental justice. This also works in favor of the 
environment per se and for individuals who have been affected by degraded environment in 
their near surroundings. Rather than a sum of money being paid to a government, compensation 
can be directed towards clean-up measures orchestrated within the framework of an MEA.  
The combination of MEAs and state responsibility offer further interesting solutions. 
Hulme argues that designation of protected zones coupled with the obligation set out to care for 
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the environment in article 55(1) of the Additional Protocol I offers an effective protection of 
the environment in armed conflict.358 Arguably, the same applies to the customary rule 
requiring due regard to be paid to the environment in military operations. If due regard is to be 
paid to the environment when planning an attack, the fact that an area is designated as a 
protected zone under an MEA which continues to apply in wartime should be considered in the 
process. In order to ensure that remedies can be attached to this, a more concrete rule prohibiting 
or limiting the targeting of protected zones is preferable. In the International Law Commission 
project on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, provisionally adopted 
draft principle 13 reads: “An area of major environmental and cultural importance designated 
by agreement as a protected zone shall be protected against any attack, as long as it does not 
contain a military objective.”359 To the extent that such a provision is included in multilateral 
treaties, or evolves to form part of customary international law, this system of rules could work 
to ensure that the remedy of compensation under the law of state responsibility is more 
available. A military operation causing damage to a protected zone that does not contain a 
military objective can then more readily be established as an internationally wrongful act, 
giving rise to state responsibility.   
 
4.2.2 The Example of the UN Compensation Commission 
When it comes to quantifying environmental damage, the UN Compensation Commission, 
established after the 1990–91 Gulf War, sets an important precedent.360 The Commission 
represents the only time, to date, that state responsibility has regulated environmental damage 
caused in war. Here, some reflections on the work of the UN Compensation Commission will 
serve to seek an understanding of state responsibility which better coheres with the polluter 
pays principle informed by environmental justice theory. 
The UN Compensation Commission was established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 687, holding Iraq liable for inter alia environmental damage.361 The Governing 
Council established that for the purposes of the Commission, environmental damage entailed: 
 
losses or expenses resulting from abatement and prevention of environmental damage [...] 
reasonable measures already taken to clean and restore the environment [...] reasonable 
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monitoring and assessment of environmental damage for the purpose of evaluating and 
abating the harm and restoring the environment.362  
 
States and international organizations were entitled to make claims for environmental damage 
under these criteria to the so-called F4 Panel. The F4 claims made included both environmental 
damage and depletion of natural resources done to states in the region of the conflict, as well 
as claims from states that had incurred costs when providing assistance seeking to mitigate the 
damage.363 The final sum awarded for environmental claims was US $5.26 billion.364 This 
included claims for expenses for monitoring and assessment projects, measures that were taken 
during or immediately after the conflict, reasonable future measures to be taken to clean and 
restore the environment, and claims for public health, loss, or depletion of natural resources and 
loss of cultural heritage.365 
Caron argues that the foundation of environmental claims differs from other claims, 
such as claims for damaged property.366 This is not to say that there cannot be claims related to 
damage of property because of environmental disruption on that property.367 What lies at the 
heart of the difference is the question of how the claims process concerns the environment per 
se, rather than the legal entity that “owns” the environment. If the state that is compensated for 
ecological damage does not use an awarded compensation to restore the environment, this 
question has not been satisfactorily resolved. The claim has then been treated as any other claim 
where property has been damaged, and not as an environmental claim.368 Consideration of this 
question is reflected in how the F4 Panel strived towards ensuring that the damages awarded 
were used to restore the environment.369  
Caron holds that in cases of environmental claims, the state should be viewed as an 
agent, acting for the environment, rather than as a principal, which owns the environment that 
has been damaged.370 He demonstrates how the UN Compensation Commission can serve as 
                                                
362 UN Compensation Commission, Governing Council Decision 7, UN Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev.1, 28 
November 1991 (as revised 17 March 1992), para. 35.  
363 Sands et al., p. 722.  
364 Sand, p. 430.   
365 J. Klee, “The Process” in C. Payne and P. H. Sand (eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation 
Commission: Environmental Liability, electronic ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 29–66, at p. 38.  
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(eds.), Gulf War Reparations and the UN Compensation Commission: Environmental Liability, electronic ed. 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 265–276, at pp. 267f.  
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an example to further such practice through its shifting of perspectives from the classic 
interstate point of view to one which focuses on the relevant communities and the environment 
that has been damaged.371 Such a shift represents a possible way to ensure a greater degree of 
distributive justice within a state, since it works to actively ensure that restoration actually takes 
place. It can also lead to a greater degree of procedural justice, since the environment is treated 
as the principal in the case. Being treated as the principal, rather than a possession, could 
represent an increase in respect for the environment as a legal entity. If the environment, rather 
than the government, is viewed and treated as the principal of an environmental claim, the 
government cannot neglect to spend the money awarded on restoring the environment.372 It 
could also mean that the actor representing the environment can be flexible, depending on the 
legal arena. One possible such actor is UNEP, which would “perhaps more naturally have an 
eco-systemic perspective encompassing several states”.373 It should be pointed out that this 
perspective does not rule out that claims for compensation for market losses can be made as 
well: “a state could assert claims as both principal and agent – principal for its loss of legitimate 
use, agent for what it holds in trust for a broader community.”374 Another benefit of this shift 
in perspective is that it can serve to bring more attention to the claims that are based on 
“foundational, long-term and often yet unknown damage”, rather than those based only on 
market interest.375 Additionally, the shift in perspective can offer guidance in prioritizing 
claims. The clean-up of an area which is critical from an ecological perspective may cost the 
same as the clean-up of a less critical area. Considering the environment as the relevant agent 
provides a tool for prioritizing a critical area over a less critical one.376 
One aspect which speaks against using the Compensation Commission as a future model 
for handling reparations for environmental damage is that it dealt mostly with non-
environmental claims. In fact, 90 % of the roughly US $52 billion awarded in total by the 
Commission concerned other types of claims.377 Another limit to its precedential value is that 
there was no need for the Commission to find liability on the part of Iraq. It had already been 
determined by UN Security Council resolution 687 and unequivocally accepted by Iraq, as part 
of the ceasefire agreement, that Iraq was liable for “any direct loss, damage, including 
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environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations.”378 
Despite these concerns, the work of the panel is undeniably beneficial in two ways. First, 
as pointed out by Shelton and Cutting, the methods used to estimate environmental damage can 
be used in future cases of state responsibility for environmental damage, regardless of the rule 
breached giving rise to liability.379 Second, the panel saw its work as responding to “the 
common concern for the protection and conservation of the environment”, entailing obligations 
“toward the international community and future generations”.380 As outlined above, this 
provides a useful shift in perspective towards viewing the state as an agent acting on behalf of 
the environment, something which could serve to ensure a fuller reflection of the polluter pays 
principle in cases of state responsibility for environmental damage.  
 
4.2.3 Suggestions for Further Research  
There are various legal instruments that set out the rights of people to live in a healthy 
environment. Such provisions aimed at protecting human rights can serve to provide indirect 
protection of the environment in armed conflicts. In fact, estimations show that more than half 
of UN Member states have adopted constitutional environmental guarantees, such as the right 
to a certain quality of environment.381 Concern for the quality of environment in which humans 
live is also reflected in article 54 of Additional Protocol I and article 14 of Additional Protocol 
II, which prohibit damage to the natural environment that is indispensable for the survival of 
the local population.   
The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights provides that “[a]ll peoples shall 
have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development”.382 In 
addition, the African Commission has stated that even in a situation of civil war, derogations 
from the rights in the Charter are not permitted.383 In Social and Economic Rights Centre 
(SERAC) v. Nigeria the African Commission found the Nigerian Federal Government 
responsible for violations of the right to a healthy environment under the Charter due to the 
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military activities in the Niger Delta.384 The right to a healthy environment under article 24 of 
the African Charter is clearly of great interest to further studies on remedies for environmental 
damage in the region.  
As touched upon in section 1.3, environmental justice theory has been used in ways to 
point out inequalities between different groups of people concerning the quality of the 
environment in which they live. The theory of environmental justice applied in this thesis is 
therefore particularly well suited for further research on this topic. Therefore, a possible area 
for further research could be to ask to what extent provisions aiming to protect human rights 
contribute to finding remedies that reflect the polluter pays principle and provide environmental 
justice. Special consideration could then be taken to the possible tensions between 
compensating for economic loss of humans and compensating pure ecological damage.   
An additional such area is the protection offered by provisions primarily aiming to 
protect property or cultural property during armed conflict. Scholars have considered the 
potential of such provisions to provide indirect protection to the environment.385 Such 
provisions are especially interesting in relation to state responsibility and the polluter pays 
principle, since there is relatively well-developed case law on liability for environmental 
property damage.386 Both the protection of property and human rights in relation to 
environmental protection in armed conflict have also been addressed in the reports prepared on 
the topic Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts in the International Law 
Commission.387  
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5. Annex  
 
Figure 1. Map adapted from UNEP (2007) showing the maximum oil extent of the spill resulting from 
the bombing of the storage tanks at Jiyeh electrical power plant in 2006.  
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Figure 2. Four maps adapted from Anejionu et al. (2015) depicting the distribution of oil spill 
incidents in the Niger Delta between January 2013 and November 2014. (A) Distribution of spills in 
the major ecosystems. (B) Distribution spills across the Niger Delta states. (C) Distribution of the 
different contaminants. (D) Causes of the spills.   
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